

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN

HEARING ON SOVIET STRATEGY AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

United States Senate
Monday, March 11, 1985
Washington, D.C.

MILTON REPORTING, INC.

Official Reporters

1601 CONNECTICUT AVE., N.W., SUITE 301 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009

Phones: (202) 833-3598

833-3599

C O N T E N T S

STATEMENT OF:

PAGE

JEANE KIRKPATRICK, United States

Ambassador to the United Nations

6

ALEX ALEXIEV, Social Scientist, Rand

Corporation

YOSSEF BODANSKY, Soviet Military Expert

THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE, Center for Afghanistan

Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha

62

1 and clinics as well as the hunting down of private
2 organizations seeking to provide some small measure of
3 medical care inside Afghanistan.

4 Today's hearing will focus on Soviet strategy. Many
5 believe the Soviets have failed in Afghanistan and have
6 become bogged down. In my view, that is a misperception. In
7 my view, the Soviets have a long-term, low-cost strategy that
8 is working quite well; namely, hold onto the important
9 installations and mercilessly destroy the means of resistance
10 by creating terror, hunger and disease.

11 The Soviet strategy is working. Out of a preinvasion
12 population of 15 million persons, approximately, 1 million
13 out of 15 million, 1 million Afghans have been killed and
14 another 4 million have been driven by fear and misery into
15 foreign exile.

16 Just for purposes of comparison, if this misery and
17 calamity had been inflicted on the United States, that would
18 mean some 15 million Americans would have been killed and
19 some 59 million Americans, in proportion, would have been
20 driven into exile. The cost to the Soviets, about 8,000
21 killed.

22 The Soviets will succeed in their long-term strategy
23 providing three conditions continue to exist. First, the
24 Freedom Fighters are denied weapons which are effective
25 against Soviet aircraft, particularly the MI-24 attack

1 helicopter. Second, the Freedom Fighters are denied the
2 means to deal with hunger and famine. And third, the free
3 world continues to fail to undertake a massive public
4 diplomacy effort to exert every possible pressure on the
5 Soviets to withdraw, including the pressure of genuine
6 linkage between Soviet conduct and the signing of
7 international agreements.

8 So far the free world, including the United States, in
9 my view, has unwittingly cooperated in meeting the conditions
10 for Soviet success in Afghanistan. We hope these hearings
11 will bring about a change in that sad and disgraceful
12 situation.

13 Congressman Ritter.

14 Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased
15 to participate in this third in a series of hearings on the
16 situation in Afghanistan.

17 In the first series, we heard about Soviet policy to
18 deny food to the Afghan people, particularly in some of the
19 more insulated areas. We heard about the signals of
20 impending famine.

21 In the second series of hearings, we heard about the
22 terrible medical assistance to people who are not only
23 wounded in battle, wounded in indiscriminate bombings by the
24 Soviets, but also people who are, because of the conditions
25 in the country, because of the lack of food, exposed to

1 diseases that once were preventable.

2 Indeed, this policy is scorched earth and beyond.

3 Indeed, this policy is to deny the Afghanistan people their
4 nation and to essentially remove the Afghanistan people from
5 Afghanistan. This policy, if you carry it out, next year,
6 the year after, five years, ten years, has got to remove the
7 Afghan people from Afghanistan, either through death, through
8 weakness, through sickness, or through another kind of
9 genocide -- migratory genocide.

10 It is awfully important that the American people
11 understand what is happening in Afghanistan. All of the
12 major human rights organizations in the world have taken up
13 the subject of Afghanistan. The recent UN Commission on
14 Human Rights has made an excellent report, in addition to our
15 Helsinki Report, in addition to the Helsinki Watch Group, in
16 addition to Amnesty.

17 The world knows what is going on in Afghanistan. When
18 one asks the question what is the Soviet aim in Afghanistan,
19 it has got to come out Afghanistan without the Afghan people.

20 If you look at the high ground above South Asia, if you
21 look at the short distance between Afghan airfields and the
22 Arabian Sea, if you look at the deep water port of Gwadar,
23 sitting to the south of the Baluchistan province, you see a
24 dream, not only of commissars but of czars, a millennial dream
25 of dominance of South Asia, for sitting astride the shipping

lanes of the west for not only oil but other valuable strategic materials and materials of trade and commerce.

As the Senator has stated, the course of this war extrapolated out, given the cost to the Soviets presently, is the death of the Afghan nation. We aim to call attention to what is going on so as to bring to the Afghan people a greater ability to resist, be it food, be it medicine, or be it the arms to neutralize some of the high technology capability that is being brought to bear against them.

The Senator mentioned specifically the MI-24 attack helicopters. These are the latest armored battle machines that go into action against villages and innocent civilians.

If we do not act now, we will have missed a crucial moment in the history of western civilization. We will have given to the Soviets one of the great strategic victories in modern times.

I commend the Senator and my colleagues on the Task Force on Afghanistan for bringing attention to this and bringing such a distinguished witness as Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick to appear before us today. Thank you.

Senator Humphrey. Indeed our first witness is Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, we are pleased and proud to have you with us here this morning, and you may proceed as you wish.

1 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEANE KIRKPATRICK,
2 AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

3 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Senator Humphrey.

4 I may say that I am especially pleased to be here this
5 morning to appear before this Congressional Task Force on
6 Afghanistan. I too commend you for having organized these
7 hearings to focus attention on this desperately important
8 human, political and geostrategic problem with which we are
9 all confronted.

10 I also commend Congressman Ritter for joining you in
11 these hearings.

12 As you know, we deal regularly with the problem of the
13 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan inside the United Nations.
14 Annually the General Assembly considers the continuing
15 occupation of Afghanistan, the human and the international
16 consequences of that occupation, and passes a resolution
17 concerning Afghanistan which not only commands the support of
18 the overwhelming majority of the nations of the General
19 Assembly, of the United Nations that is to say, but also
20 commands larger majorities each year.

21 In representing the United States in that forum over the
22 last four years, I have had repeated occasion to speak to
23 this question, and I thank you for having invited me today to
24 once again address this question.

25 I know that other witnesses have covered some of the

1 same topics which I will touch on today, but I hope you will
2 bear with me. I would like to request that my written
3 statement be incorporated into the record of the Task Force.

4 Senator Humphrey. Of course.

5 (The statement follows:)
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I will summarize that statement
2 in my oral testimony.

3 I should like to begin by asserting that the Soviet
4 occupation, as you know, as we all know, continues, as it has
5 over the past five years, but there are significant
6 differences. Both sides in Afghanistan are stronger. The
7 fighting is more intense. Changes in Soviet force profile
8 and tactics are the result, we believe, of the Red Army and
9 associated Soviet elements taking a greater role in the
10 fighting.

11 The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of
12 Afghanistan remain ineffective and unreliable and have
13 consistently frustrated Soviet efforts to build up those
14 Afghan forces. The Mujahideen exhibit continued improvements
15 in armaments, coordination, organization, capability. Over
16 the past six months, compared to the winter season in
17 previous years, fighting within Afghanistan and cross-border
18 violations by Soviet and Afghan forces against Pakistan and
19 Iran have also increased. There is a continued effort to
20 intensify the fighting in the border regions, and we expect
21 that that may continue.

22 Finally, in summary, I may say, the costs to the Soviet
23 Union of continuing the occupation and devastation of
24 Afghanistan are very high, but we believe those costs are
25 bearable.

1 Moscow's primary thrust has been to seek a military
2 solution to the problem of maintaining a totally pro-Soviet
3 regime in Afghanistan. The Soviets are aware that they are
4 far from having achieved the military solution which they
5 seek, but they are clearly prepared to conduct a very long
6 struggle to that end. And evidence of that preparation and
7 will proliferates.

8 They understand that the only reliable military forces
9 in their effort to conquer Afghanistan are Soviet forces.
10 They hope that in the long run it will prove possible to
11 transfer more of the fighting burden to the Afghans.

12 Some Soviet officials appear to believe that control of
13 the country, aside from the key cities, cannot be gained by
14 Soviet forces as presently committed. But nonetheless, the
15 Soviet government is not apparently at this time prepared to
16 make the substantially larger commitment that would be needed
17 for a more rapid victory. Soviet military activities in
18 Afghanistan for the past several years have consequently
19 represented a search for more effective tactics rather than a
20 campaign for an early victory.

21 As you are aware, Soviet forces in Afghanistan have
22 increased over the past year by something over 10,000 to some
23 110,000 to 115,000 Soviet troops. These troops are supported
24 by some 30,000 to 35,000 active duty troops across the
25 border, inside the Soviet Union, under a command based in

1 Tashkent. These arrangements facilitate the occasional
2 operational use of forces and increased use of Soviet
3 aircraft based in the Soviet Union itself. The bombers which
4 carpet bombed the Panjshir Valley during last year's
5 offensive were staged directly from the Soviet Union.

6 In addition to the marginal numerical increase, Soviet
7 forces in Afghanistan have been strengthened by the
8 deployment of troops better suited for counter insurgency
9 operations and better equipped for counter insurgency,
10 including improved equipment and firepower and upgraded air
11 support.

12 Soviet special forces are making their presence felt by
13 unconventional attacks on the Mujahideen. Military
14 police-type units are being utilized for screening traffic on
15 the highways and for urban control duties in Kabul. Hardware
16 improvements have included the arrival of more artillery and
17 rocket launchers, including some not previously used in
18 Afghanistan. The Soviets have been further strengthening and
19 hardening their bases and facilities and improving their
20 logistical network.

21 We believe these are indications of a readiness and an
22 intention to remain in Afghanistan for some time to come.

23 There have also been refinements in military tactics to
24 which I have referred and with which you are familiar. The
25 Afghan military, as I have indicated, remains worse than

1 useless in its own counter insurgency operation. It is still
2 a source of major munitions for the Mujahideen, and
3 desertions from the Afghan armies organized by the Soviet
4 Union continue to be high.

5 More regime garrisons would have been overrun by the
6 guerrillas if the Afghan military occupying those garrisons
7 were not perceived as nonthreatening sources of supply to the
8 Mujahideen.

9 Afghan troops desert at every opportunity and still
10 continue frequently or periodically to desert en masse. One
11 Afghan division reportedly lost some 900 men, including
12 officers, at a single stroke.

13 Problems of replacing the Afghan army and filling its
14 ranks continue. The use of pressganging and of offers that
15 are intended to be very attractive to volunteers are common.
16 An ill-fated scheme to recruit high school students has
17 backfired as over half of the students failed their exams in
18 order to avoid being taken into the Afghan army.

19 More important, despite concentrated efforts such as
20 training in the Soviet Union, the Soviets have so far been
21 unable to build a large ideologically committed cadre in the
22 Afghan armed forces on whom they could rely and to whom they
23 could eventually hand over the protection of the regime. The
24 majority of leftists in the military belong to the Khalq
25 faction of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, but

1 even their loyalty is suspect.

2 Partly to mollify the Khalqi officers, but also probably
3 as a mark of their general dissatisfaction with the
4 performance of the DRS military, the Soviets have removed
5 their Minister of Defense. Abdul Zader, a Parcham leaning
6 pragmatist, was replaced in December of '84 by a man more
7 strongly identified with the Khalq and who had been trained
8 in the Soviet Union and had spent most of the last two years
9 inside the Soviet Union.

10 Combat has been focused in the Panjshir Valley, as you
11 are aware. Border violations to which I referred have
12 increased. One result of the fighting near the border is a
13 continuing high level of Soviet-Afghan violations of
14 Pakistani territory by reconnaissance flights, bombing
15 attacks and shellings.

16 The resistance, incredibly enough, has continued to
17 multiply and be reinforced inside Afghanistan. Operational
18 cooperation among the various fighting groups inside
19 Afghanistan also continues to improve, although the parties
20 remain fundamentally divided.

21 It was interesting to note that the Afghan regime, the
22 Karmal regime, took no note and had no celebration of its
23 fifth anniversary since its installation but, instead,
24 concentrated on the twentieth anniversary of the founding of
25 the Democratic Party of Afghanistan, at which celebration

1 Soviet representatives were, of course, featured.

2 Inside Afghanistan, as you know, trade and aid are ever
3 more oriented toward the Soviet Union, although a variety of
4 goods from many countries can still be brought into the Kabul
5 Bazaar. Scattered reductions in precipitation, including
6 effects of war, including Soviet regime destruction of crops
7 and agricultural infrastructure, have caused food shortages
8 in some areas, already about which you have been informed and
9 to which I will refer again.

10 The efforts at reorientation of the Afghan economy
11 toward the Soviet Union and its integration into the Soviet
12 economy have also had negative effects on the indigenous
13 economy.

14 The Soviet policy in Afghanistan would seem to look
15 toward continued long-range involvement in that region, and
16 of course, it includes a diplomatic aspect. From the outset,
17 the Soviet Union has looked upon diplomatic activities with
18 regard to Afghanistan as an adjunct to its military
19 operations. Diplomacy presently centers on the UN-sponsored
20 proximity meetings in Geneva. The last in August 1984 and
21 the next scheduled for May 1985 were delayed because of the
22 Pakistani elections.

23 The Soviet position regarding this process has so far
24 not changed. Moscow continues to insist that prior cessation
25 of what they call outside interference in support of the

1 Mujahideen is a precondition for any Soviet troop withdrawal.
2 And Moscow stands firm on the question of troop withdrawal.
3 That is, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is
4 a bilateral issue which can be discussed only with its Afghan
5 client stated and puppet government. The Kabul regime
6 itself, they insist, is not subject to international
7 discussions.

8 The Soviet Union has apparently been willing to keep the
9 UN efforts going, in part at least because it enables them to
10 hold at bay international demands for a negotiated
11 settlement, and it provides them an arena in which to
12 maintain that the key to the Afghan problem lies in stanching
13 the flow of assistance to the Mujahideen. It gives them, in
14 other words, an opportunity to redefine the problem as one of
15 assistance to the Mujahideen rather than a problem of
16 continuing Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

17 From the Soviet viewpoint, the most serious problem
18 continues to be the strength of the Mujahideen. So far, the
19 evidence suggests that the Soviet Union considers the
20 diplomatic consequences of the Afghan war to be acceptable,
21 much as they seem to consider the military consequences of
22 the Afghan war acceptable. It is nonetheless true that the
23 continuation of that occupation has a negative consequence
24 for the Soviet image and its position in such world bodies as
25 the United Nations.

1 The Afghan war has created some domestic problems with
2 the Soviets as well, but none of those problems appear to be
3 unmanageable. The economic burden of the war on the Soviet
4 Union does not appear to be unacceptable. Direct military
5 expenditures pertaining to Afghanistan probably amount, we
6 estimate, to less than one percent of the Soviet military
7 expenditures. And even this is offset by gains in combat
8 experience, equipment testing, and the like.

9 Related economic assistance to the Babrak regime has
10 probably not yet reached the level granted to major client
11 states of Cuba and Vietnam. So it is important to keep the
12 Soviet investment in context and in proportion.

13 There have been occasional reports of efforts by
14 potential Soviet conscripts to avoid service in Afghanistan,
15 but this and related problems caused by the growing number of
16 casualties and returning veterans are also manageable under
17 the Soviet system.

18 There has been a slow growth in Soviet media coverage of
19 the Afghan war, recently resorting to patriotic literary
20 allusions and even occasionally featuring articles describing
21 the individual heroism of Soviet soldiers in combat. This
22 coverage, too, seems to be preparing the Soviet populace for
23 a long haul in Afghanistan.

24 To understand what the Soviet war means to the Soviet
25 Union, and why the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is

1 continued, I believe it is necessary to understand why the
2 Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the first place.

3 The answer to that question, why did the Soviet Union
4 invade Afghanistan, is not easily come by. It is not a
5 simple question. Obviously, they did not invade Afghanistan
6 to eliminate a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.
7 No such threat existed. For decades, the Soviet Union had
8 described its relations with Afghanistan as a very model of
9 peaceful coexistence and as proof of how the Soviet Union
10 could live next to small neighboring countries without
11 interfering in their internal affairs.

12 Obviously, the Soviet Union did not invade Afghanistan
13 to prevent the threat of Muslim fundamentalism from spreading
14 to the Soviet Union's own Central Asian Muslim provinces.
15 The fact is that traditional Islam of Afghanistan did not
16 threaten either the Soviets or even an Afghan communist
17 regime. As long as the government of Afghanistan was ready
18 to leave traditional patterns of life essentially
19 undisturbed, the Afghan populace seems to have remained
20 indifferent to the specific form of government, including a
21 communist government, which ruled them.

22 Obviously, the Soviet Union did not invade Afghanistan
23 because of a desire to install there a communist government.
24 In fact, a communist government had already been installed in
25 Afghanistan. When the April 1978 coup eliminated the Daoud

1 regime, which was nonaligned but independent, that coup of
2 April 1978 brought the Khelqi communist regime to power.
3 That regime, the Khelqi communist regime, could not be
4 faulted for lack of zeal since it had set about trying to
5 transform Afghan society.

6 It is true that the effort of that regime to transform
7 Afghan society produced opposition and resistance among
8 traditional Afghanistan. That resistance occurred at a time
9 of unprecedented Soviet expansion. When Soviet analysts were
10 convinced that the world correlation of forces had shifted in
11 their favor. And it is, I believe, this conjunction of
12 events, of resistance by the population to efforts at
13 wholesale transformation of their way of life, and the period
14 of unprecedented momentum toward unprecedented Soviet
15 expansion, this conjunction of events, I believe, constituted
16 the explanation for the Soviet decision to invade
17 Afghanistan.

18 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Soviet
19 Union invaded Afghanistan because they intended to
20 effectively essentially incorporate that country. Following
21 the fall of Saigon, the expansion of the Soviet empire and
22 Soviet influence preceded rapidly in Asia, Africa, Central
23 America, elsewhere, creating new satellites and client states
24 in far-flung places such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia,
25 Benin, South Yemen, Nicaragua, Grenada, and elsewhere.

1 This expansion largely proceeded through subversion and
2 proxy forces, however, and not through the direct use of
3 Soviet military force. It is very important to recall that
4 the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the first direct use
5 of Soviet military force outside the Soviet bloc since World
6 War II.

7 For the first time since World War II, the Soviet Union
8 invaded an independent country. That invasion, launched on
9 Christmas Eve of 1979, altered the climate and the course of
10 world politics, severely aggravated the tensions between East
11 and West, and had an important effect on the prospects for
12 continuing stability in South Asia and the Persian Gulf.

13 It was, in short, a momentous event, and it is a
14 momentous event which we are seeking to explain here. It was
15 not one of a number of comparable initiatives. It was a
16 unique effort to conquer by military force an independent
17 country.

18 The invasion, as we know, has rent the fabric of
19 Afghanistan society, driving nearly half the population of
20 Afghanistan into either internal or external exile, driving
21 millions of Afghans outside their own country, devastating
22 the Afghan economy, threatening now to produce a famine of
23 major proportions. It has tied down approximately 150,000
24 Soviet troops in Afghanistan and across the border.

25 Soviet casualties, as we know, have been high. Their

objectives still eludes them. This has, as you, Senator, referred to or suggested, left some observers, especially American observers, speculating that the Soviet Union may be stuck in its own Vietnam, may be bogged down in a quagmire that spreads its resources, bleeds its army, and promises failure.

I believe there are fundamental flaws in the various Vietnam analogies and efforts to understand the Soviet position in Afghanistan by way of the American interpretation of our experience in Vietnam. I should like to suggest, first, that Vietnam was a major political problem for the United States because of the response of American public opinion to continued war.

Vivid information on American casualties was not only available, it was virtually inescapable. Criticism of U.S. Government policy was not only possible, it was ubiquitous. Organized opposition to the U.S. role in Vietnam was widespread and effective. Periodic elections provided an opportunity to express popular dissatisfaction with the American Vietnam policy.

But all these conditions and all these problems depend on democracy and a democratic political culture. They depend on a free press, on the right to assemble, the right to oppose, the right to organize an opposition candidacy, the right to turn an American government out if the majority of

1 Americans disapprove of its policy.

2 None of these conditions of democracy prevail in the
3 Soviet Union.

4 Second, there is a profound difference, and a very
5 important one, in American and Soviet time frames. If the
6 goal of Soviet strategy is, as most observers today believe,
7 the transformation of Afghan society and politics, then the
8 Soviets have already made substantial progress to that end.
9 What Louis Dupree has called migratory genocide and the
10 "rubbleization" of Afghanistan is far advanced. Chemical
11 weapons, carpet bombing, pillage, destruction of irrigation
12 networks, destruction of crops, leveling of villages, have
13 had the effect of expelling, disorganizing, demoralizing, to
14 some extent, the population.

15 A massive program of separating eight and nine year old
16 children from their parents and sending them to the Soviet
17 Union for education is, of course, preparing a new generation
18 and an evidence of the Soviet time frame, the time frame in
19 which they are considering their problem.

20 The Soviets have sometimes been clear about their goals
21 and more often about their time frame. "Time changes
22 everything," one Soviet official noted. "In another 10 or 20
23 years, the new generation of Afghans will view our presence
24 differently."

25 The short-range time frames in which we Americans think

1 about foreign policy are profoundly ill-suited, I think, to
2 understanding Soviet goals and policies in Afghanistan. Our
3 assumptions about public opinion and foreign policy are
4 equally misleading. Our own lack of interest in territorial
5 expansion makes it difficult for us to understand Soviet
6 goals and policies.

7 It seems likely, I would insist, that the Soviet goal in
8 Afghanistan is effective incorporation of Afghanistan and
9 achievement of a warm water port and geopolitical access to
10 Iran and Pakistan. The Soviet claim that it is providing
11 fraternal assistance to Afghanistan with its limited military
12 contingent constitutes a kind of ominous echo of the
13 assurances given by the Soviet Union to two of Afghanistan's
14 neighbors who were once the independent Muslim states of
15 Khiva and Bokara and which are, of course, today part of the
16 Soviet Union.

17 The Soviets have already taken significant steps in the
18 direction of the military, economic and social integration of
19 Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere. Soviet military officers
20 in significant numbers are learning the Baluchi language.

21 The Soviets have consolidated their military transport
22 and communications infrastructure, including the expansion of
23 existing airfields and the completion of the bridge across
24 the Amu Darya River. They have tightened their grips on the
25 strategic Wakhan corridor which rests on Pakistan's

1 northernmost border and links Afghanistan with China. They
2 have tied Afghanistan's economy tightly to those of the
3 Soviet bloc through a proliferation of economic and trade
4 agreements.

5 Perhaps most significant is the Soviet effort to reshape
6 Afghan culture and replace the decimated intellectual and
7 middle classes with a new elite trained in the Soviet mold.
8 Thousands of Afghanistans, including, as I suggested,
9 children between the ages of six and nine, are being trained
10 in the Soviet Union and other bloc countries while the Afghan
11 education system is being overhauled and restructured along
12 Soviet lines.

13 The Sovietization of Kabul University is made evident by
14 the presence of Soviet advisors at all levels of
15 administration and instruction and in the preference given to
16 the party activists in admissions. The curriculum of
17 Afghanistan's primary education system has been redrawn to
18 promote indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist ideology and to
19 prepare young Afghans for further study in the Soviet Union.

20 Afghanistan would not be the only prize of such a
21 development. Babrak Karmal promised in May 1982 that before
22 long the Afghan army itself would be capable of playing a
23 role "not only in Afghanistan but in the region as well."

24 Some strategists, including Rossane Klass, believe:
25 "There can be no longer any doubt that Soviet moves in

1 Afghanistan since 1978 have been aimed at creating a
2 strategic base from which to control Iran, Pakistan, the
3 Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean." "If Pakistan can be
4 collapsed or neutralized and detached from Washington by
5 threats," Klass wrote, "the Soviet Union will effectively
6 dominate the vast area from the Horn of Africa to the Strait
7 of Malacca without having fired a shot."

8 Ten major Soviet air bases have been built in
9 Afghanistan, and more are in the works. All are aimed beyond
10 Afghanistan.

11 The fate of Afghanistan is profoundly important to the
12 United States, to the independent nations of Asia, and,
13 indeed, to the independent nations of the world. The fate of
14 Afghanistan is important for humanitarian reasons, for
15 reasons of example, and for geostrategic reasons.

16 The Afghan people have been gassed, bombed, burned,
17 buried, driven from their homes, and now they are threatened
18 with being starved. "Aid workers with experience in
19 famines," the Economist reported, "say that Afghanistan is
20 sliding towards disaster." Dr. Frances O'Souza asserted that
21 some 500,000 people in Afghanistan are in imminent danger of
22 starvation.

23 Obviously, there are important valid humanitarian
24 reasons for assisting Afghans inside and outside of
25 Afghanistan.

1 The resistance of the Afghan nation to incorporation,
2 its struggle to survive, is a challenge to the carefully
3 cultivated Soviet image of invincibility. The truth is that
4 Soviet triumph in Afghanistan is not inevitable, and defeat
5 of the Mujahideen is not inevitable, and the expansion of
6 Soviet power in the region is not inevitable. The death of
7 the Afghan nation is not inevitable. If Soviet time frames
8 are long, so are Afghans' time frames long. And the
9 Afghani's determination to survive, the determination that
10 the Afghan nation shall survive, is a long-range goal. It is
11 a deeply embedded commitment which the Afghan people are in
12 no danger of abandoning.

13 The final consequences of Soviet goals and Afghan
14 resistance are not known today and they are not even
15 predictable. But it is clear that support for the survival
16 of the Afghan people is a moral, a political, and a
17 geostrategic necessity.

18 It is also clear that victory or surrender are not the
19 only alternatives facing the Soviet Union today. Nor does
20 anyone desire to confront the Soviet Union with only the
21 alternatives of victory or surrender.

22 The UN General Assembly's resolution passed last year by
23 the largest margin ever contains four major elements offering
24 the basis for a negotiated settlement that will be just and
25 viable, one in which the legitimate security interests of all

1 parties could be protected.

2 The elements are the immediate withdrawal of all foreign
3 troops, that is Soviet troops, from Afghanistan; the
4 preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
5 political independence, nonaligned character of Afghanistan;
6 the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of
7 government and to choose their economic, political and social
8 system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion
9 and constraint; and the creation of the necessary conditions
10 which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily
11 and in security to their homes.

12 These conditions were endorsed by President Reagan in
13 his speech before the UN General Assembly last fall and,
14 indeed, have been endorsed by the overwhelming majority of
15 nation member states. We believe that this is a basis for an
16 honorable solution which could serve the interests of all
17 parties.

18 The United States supports the efforts of the Secretary
19 General and his personal representative, Mr. Diego Cordovez.
20 We support, too, the efforts of the government of Pakistan to
21 seek a solution through this media. We believe that these
22 efforts offer the basis for hope that a negotiated political
23 settlement can be found which will end the terrible war
24 against the Afghan people.

25 We believe that the people of Afghanistan, of Pakistan,

1 and of the Soviet Union, would profit greatly from such a
2 peaceable solution. In the meanwhile, we believe that there
3 are no inevitable outcomes in Afghanistan.

4 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Madam Ambassador, for that
6 comprehensive and excellent statement.

7 You cited the suffering of the people of Afghanistan at
8 the hands of the Soviet government. You said that they have
9 been gassed, bombed, burned, starved, you used Louis Dupree's
10 term migratory genocide.

11 Is there any reason to suppose that the demise of
12 Mr. Chernenko will make any difference in this matter, or is
13 the Soviet goal and strategy of such a nature as to continue
14 irrespective of who the new leader may be?

15 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Humphrey, I would like
16 to say, first of all, that since the Soviet Union is a
17 thoroughly closed society, we know very little about the
18 details of the succession process or who a new leader is
19 likely to be.

20 We do know certain things, however. We know that an
21 effort has been made, particularly in the period since
22 Brezhnev ascended to power, to institutionalize the
23 succession in the Soviet government and to indeed provide
24 collective leadership of a kind that would minimize the
25 effects of an individual on policy.

1 We also know, however, that in spite of those efforts,
2 individuals do apparently continue to make some difference in
3 the Soviet leadership. It does seem to matter somewhat who
4 achieves power and who fails to achieve power, who is on top
5 and who is in the supporting cast.

6 It would appear, for example, that the increased
7 political activity in the disinformation field during the
8 Andropov period reflected the prior experience of
9 Premier Andropov. It would appear also that the world
10 context and Soviet judgments about the world correlation of
11 forces make a real difference in their strategy and their
12 tactics.

13 I have already suggested that we believe that the
14 momentum in the expansion of Soviet influence and control in
15 the world in the period between the fall of Saigon and the
16 invasion of Afghanistan encouraged the decision to invade
17 Afghanistan. It was an unusual decision and an unusually
18 reckless decision.

19 I think there is some reason to suppose that the
20 character of the leader who emerges as "premos enterparis" in
21 the Soviet Politburo now could affect decisions concerning
22 strategy in Afghanistan, not immediately, because of the
23 institutionalization of decisionmaking and because
24 bureaucracies are slow in fact to change in any country, and
25 certainly as thoroughly bureaucratized a system as the Soviet

1 system is slow to change and resistant to change. But it is
2 possible. It could make a difference.

3 That is a reason, Senator Humphrey, that I desire
4 particularly to emphasize this morning, that if there is an
5 honorable way out for the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, their
6 victory and surrender or victory and defeat are not the only
7 alternatives available to them. And we would, of course,
8 profoundly hope that the new leader of the Soviet Union would
9 assess the total cost to the Soviet Union, diplomatic as well
10 as military, human as well as economic, and conclude that it
11 was in the interest of his country as well to seek that
12 honorable way out.

13 Senator Humphrey. You used a phrase which the Soviets
14 are fond of using themselves, correlation of forces. We know
15 from Soviet literature that the Soviets feel that the
16 correlation of forces has shifted in their favor.

17 Do I read into your statement the belief that the
18 Soviets have moved in this way, which is unprecedented since
19 World War II, to invade a neighboring country which is not a
20 part of the Eastern Bloc and certainly not a threat to them,
21 do I read into your statement the belief that the Soviets
22 have moved into Afghanistan because they believe in effect
23 they can get away with it and if they succeed in Afghanistan,
24 it is quite certain, given their belief that the correlation
25 of forces has shifted in their favor, that they will continue

1 beyond perhaps into the region known as Baluchistan?

2 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Humphrey, I believe
3 that that was the assumption in December 1979 when the Soviet
4 government made that move.

5 Senator Humphrey. Yes.

6 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Yes. I believe that the
7 momentum to which I referred, that they had achieved
8 following the fall of Saigon, encouraged just such an
9 assumption on their part. And I believe that assumption was
10 probably the key force in the decision to move in, to invade
11 that independent, nonaligned neighboring country.

12 Now, I think that that momentum has not only been halted
13 but thoroughly halted in the intervening four years. So I
14 think the calculations and assumptions made by the Soviet
15 leadership in 1979 would no longer be made by them today.

16 Senator Humphrey. Well, my question I guess in its
17 essence is this: If the Soviets succeed in Sovietizing
18 Afghanistan and incorporating Afghanistan into the Soviet
19 empire, is it likely or unlikely that they will be satisfied
20 with that gain or will they likely pursue this centuries-long
21 thrust towards the Indian Ocean?

22 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I do not believe,
23 Senator Humphrey, that there is any basis for projecting
24 probable future behavior except by the examination of past
25 behavior and experience. I believe that history remains our

1 best guide, even remote history, but more especially the
2 relatively recent history of the last decades. And I think
3 that the position, for example, of Soviet forces today near
4 the Iranian border and Pakistani border and the Chinese
5 border and elsewhere in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean
6 and the development of those substantial naval forces and so
7 forth suggests that continued expansion aims must be
8 considered at least as a reality, a probability, if not a
9 certainty.

10 I think that whether those probabilities are acted upon
11 is probably more dependent on our own policies than we like
12 to imagine.

13 Senator Humphrey. Yes. That leads into my third
14 question, which will be my last for now because I know my
15 colleagues are anxious to have an opportunity to question
16 you. That leads into my third question, and that is you
17 stated that this is a matter of profound importance and that
18 triumph for the Soviets is not inevitable and death for the
19 Afghan people and nation is not inevitable. What should the
20 West be doing in that case?

21 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Humphrey, I would like
22 to say, too, that my judgment is precisely the same for
23 Cambodia and the people of Angola, in spite of the
24 devastation of that suffering land and nation, under Pol Pot
25 first and then under the Vietnamese invasion and occupation

1 and the puppet regime that that occupying force has
2 established, the resistance of the Cambodian people to
3 devastation and annihilation, extinction of the nation,
4 continues very powerfully. And I believe that both the
5 Afghan people and the Cambodian people will eventually
6 prevail and avoid their own extinction and the extinction of
7 their societies and cultures.

8 How can we help? Because it seems to me clearly there
9 is a moral, political and geostrategic imperative really to
10 help. I think that that problem is complex. I think there
11 are various ways in which we can help, and I think all our
12 efforts to help must be undertaken with great care and
13 prudence and with full appreciation of the risk to the
14 surrounding countries and their independence of our policies.

15 I think that, obviously, humanitarian assistance to
16 these people is appropriate. Obviously, diplomatic
17 solidarity is appropriate. Obviously, efforts such as are
18 undertaken in the United Nations to rally world opinion I
19 think are important. The Afghan leaders have told me these
20 are important to them as they continue their struggle. It
21 matters to them to understand that peoples in the world,
22 great nations, small nations, sympathize with their struggle
23 and are determined to stand with them. Obviously, all
24 appropriate forms of assistance to those seeking to ensure
25 the survival of the Afghan nation are important, and

1 obviously, they must be undertaken with full appreciation of
2 the multiple values and parties to the struggle and in
3 consultation with all other groups and governments who are
4 affected by our assistance.

5 Senator Humphrey. Congressman Ritter.

6 Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 Thank you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, for a thoughtful and
8 thorough presentation. I think there is a great deal of
9 material in your testimony that requires further thought,
10 further study, from our Task Force and by the press and the
11 American people. We are deeply grateful for the work that
12 you have put into today's testimony.

13 The Senator mentioned our obligation and you responded
14 to that. Are we doing enough to inform the people in the
15 Soviet Union of their government's action in Afghanistan? In
16 other words, if one looks at the period of the Vietnam War
17 and the political difficulties that our government faced
18 internally, one suspected that that was a major reason for
19 inability to conduct forceful policy. Wouldn't the corollary
20 be true, in its own way, if the people of the Soviet Union
21 were much better informed as to what was happening?

22 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Ritter, may I say,
23 first of all, I believe and have frequently said that the
24 information instrument in foreign policy is certainly the
25 cheapest, safest instrument available to us, and in a good

1 many contexts it is also the most important instrument
2 available to us.

3 This is the reason, I might add, that I think it is so
4 important to support and reinforce the U.S. support for our
5 radio, for Radio Free Europe, for Radio Liberty, which is our
6 principal instrument for communicating with the Soviet
7 people, Radio Martin. But Radio Liberty is the only source
8 of information that we Americans can provide the Soviets for
9 information that their own government may not choose to give
10 them and indeed, often, with regard to such troublesome
11 matters as the invasion of Afghanistan, does not choose to
12 give them.

13 I think that is important to do, important to continue.
14 I know that Radio Liberty does that on a regular basis.

15 I think that it is also important to face realistically
16 the fact that public opinion is a very different force in the
17 Soviet Union than in the United States or any democratic
18 society because even those people who are informed by their
19 radios, and they are very substantial in number, those
20 audiences are large, are not free to discuss with one another
21 and to organize resistance movements and to publicly
22 criticize the government and to seek to change government
23 policy by publicity and lobbying and election competition in
24 fact, so that I think simultaneously yes, it is important to
25 provide information, but no, we cannot expect that the

1 consequences of that will be comparable to the consequences
2 of providing information about an unpopular war to an
3 American public or that of any other democratic nation.

4 Mr. Ritter. Thank you. I do understand the difference.

5 I would like to point out that in a not-too-long-ago,
6 February 17th, edition of "Ukranian Weekly" they talked about
7 the Ukrainian samvedat and they also talked about a
8 Lithuanian samesedat. They talked about these samesedats,
9 these self-underground publications I guess you would call
10 them, in the Soviet Union, more and more are focusing on the
11 cost to these various republics, nationalities, not
12 necessarily affectionately related to Soviet domination, like
13 the Ukrainians and like the Baltics peoples, and how the
14 government of the Soviet Union is keeping the information on
15 casualties from the parents and the families of the people
16 who have been killed.

17 For example, in Lithuania, a story is told about these
18 zinc coffins come back closed and the families are not
19 allowed to look in the zinc coffins. On one occasion the
20 coffin was opened and it was supposed to be a son of a
21 Lithuanian family and it turned out to be a Central Asian was
22 in the coffin. Often the coffins are returned with
23 absolutely no recognizable element of the person. At times
24 these stories leak out.

25 I understand what you are saying. We are not about to

1 raise the level of public opinion to be equivalent to the
2 level of public opinion in the United States, public opinion
3 in the Soviet Union that is, but in terms of the morale of
4 the people, their enthusiasm for this course, in terms of the
5 morale of the Red Army itself, I believe we are not doing
6 nearly enough to use the weapon of the truth to engage in the
7 struggle of ideas, to perhaps supplement and compliment the
8 cause of the Afghan people.

9 I think there is one other element here. Is there a
10 major effort under way, and should there be a major effort
11 under way, to communicate more directly with Soviet forces
12 engaged on battlefields in Afghanistan and Soviet forces, as
13 you say, deployed on the Central Asian border to the north?

14 We have heard stories of diminishing morale. It would
15 seem to me that a telecommunications effort on the part of
16 ourselves and perhaps our NATO allies, using ideas, the
17 truth, could be remarkably effective in the midst of a
18 situation where the morale is not exactly overwhelming. We
19 hear many stories where Soviet soldiers are sent to
20 Afghanistan to protect the Chinese. They never find the
21 Chinese there. They are engaged in operations which are
22 inhuman, and the morale is concomitantly reduced.

23 Are we doing enough in this regard? We know of the
24 successes of Vladimir Rouskowsky and these little
25 transportable radio units. Can't we with our great

1 telecommunications skills do more?

2 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Ritter, certainly
3 we can do essentially as much as we want to do because we
4 have the telecommunications skill. We have the capacity.
5 And so how much we do is a matter of political decision, in
6 fact, rather than a matter of technological limitations.

7 I might just say that I think that our information
8 effort is enormously important. The truth instrument is
9 perhaps the most important instrument finally of all because
10 I do think individuals make a difference, whether we are
11 talking about the individual who will head the Politburo or
12 talking about individual Soviet soldiers sent by their
13 government to fight in Afghanistan.

14 I think it is terribly important that we adopt in
15 thinking about these problems longer-range time frames
16 ourselves and expect not immediate results, for example, from
17 an information effort but anticipate that the long-range
18 consequences of providing a fuller picture of reality to the
19 Soviets whose lives are at risk, let's say in Afghanistan,
20 may be very significant.

21 I think that is also true, if I may say so, for Cubans
22 in places like Angola and Ethiopia who -- I was reminded by
23 what you said about the Soviets -- were told they were going
24 to fight Chinese but are not fighting Chinese, and the Cubans
25 are told before they are shipped to Angola they are going to

1 be fighting white South Africans and they arrive only to find
2 there are black Angolans they are confronting.

3 That kind of reality testing can be greatly supplemented
4 by information about the nature of those struggles, provided
5 both to the combatants themselves and to their societies, I
6 think.

7 Mr. Ritter. Continuing on this one vein of using
8 information as a lever in this Afghanistan situation, would
9 the possibility exist of again using these direct broadcasts
10 to Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the Central Asian area to
11 encourage a larger scale of defection? If that is so, is it
12 possible for us and, for example, the NATO nations, not just
13 the United States alone, to set up safe havens for Soviet
14 troops that defected?

15 Again I return to the idea of the some of the ethnic
16 minorities fighting in Afghanistan, Ukrainians, wouldn't the
17 potential exist, and also given the worldwide communities
18 these populations have outside the borders of the Soviet
19 Union, wouldn't the potential exist to gain a wider rate of
20 defection of Soviet soldiers?

21 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I don't know. I really don't
22 know.

23 Mr. Ritter. We will never know unless we try.

24 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Obviously, in World War II, the
25 Japanese thought so and invented people like Tokyo Rose and

1 the Germans thought so and they invented people like
2 Lord Haha. We used radio communications to similar ends.

3 I would argue that it is worth doing. The information
4 effort is important and deserves not only full support but
5 perhaps reinforcement and stepping up, whether or not we know
6 it will produce immediate defections, because of our
7 confidence in the long-range benefits of a population more
8 accurately informed by the policies of their own governments
9 and by the nature of the world.

10 Mr. Ritter. It would seem that the alternative is a
11 situation whereby the Soviet soldiers captured are treated
12 with extreme harshness, which is something one can understand
13 on the part of the Mujahideen, but that might be
14 counterproductive also, the Soviet soldiers knowing of the
15 extreme harshness that faces them.

16 I would say it is different from the Tokyo Rose and the
17 Lord Haha, and what happened in Korea I think was an
18 excellent example. I think it is different because the
19 communist nationals -- they are not nationals -- people who
20 live in totalitarian societies, are much more apt to defect
21 than the reverse, and especially those nationalities who feel
22 themselves repressed to begin with. It would seem that we
23 haven't even begun to tap an approach that would open that
24 nerve.

25 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Ritter, I wholly

1 agree, let me say, and I would mention that through the
2 United Nations and the International Red Cross, efforts have
3 been made, of course, precisely to enhance and to, if
4 possible, ensure the greater safety of Soviets taken as
5 prisoners of war or taken as captives, captured by the
6 Mujahideen. And as I am certain you know, certain Soviet
7 prisoners were in fact transferred by the Mujahideen through
8 the Red Cross to Switzerland. I think a trickle have
9 returned to the Soviet Union now.

10 Mr. Ritter. Yes. And sometimes the conditions by which
11 they are to meet with Soviet Ambassadors, and then they get
12 the full lowdown on what awaits their families if they dare
13 not return. I think that has some major impact on what we
14 are trying to achieve.

15 Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador. I appreciate
16 your testimony.

17 Senator Humphrey. Senator Symms.

18 Senator Symms. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
19 Chairman, I would ask that my statement be made a part of the
20 record at the appropriate place.

21 (The statement to be furnished follows:)

22 COMMITTEE INSERT
23
24
25

1 Senator Symms. I would compliment both you and members
2 of the Task Force and certainly Ambassador Kirkpatrick for
3 what I consider a very thoughtful and very important
4 statement.

5 I think your point about the inevitability is most
6 important because it is so often that the Soviet doctrine is
7 based upon their belief that somehow it is inevitable they
8 are going to go ahead and get Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the
9 warm water ports, and so on and so forth. That is mentioned
10 throughout their history.

11 I quite agree with you it is not inevitable. To accept
12 it only becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

13 I can see a parallel. You mentioned Angola. I had the
14 opportunity to visit Angola last year, in January of '84, and
15 visited with Mr. Svende and others of the Aneta Group. There
16 is a lot more going for them in terms of not starving and
17 building hospitals and schools and growing farm crops than
18 appears to be going on in Afghanistan. Maybe it is just the
19 hardened climate and so forth. But I think that you make an
20 outstanding point that we need to say it over and over again.

21 Now, how we transform that into policy, it is very
22 difficult, how they can turn our moral support and hopefully
23 some material support from the people of the United States to
24 the Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan and actually have it work
25 out to be successful. I am hopeful that will become a

1 reality.

2 But looking at history, when we look back at what
3 happened with respect to World War II, with Korea, then with
4 the Vietnam experience, I think the news point that you make
5 is it is very difficult for us to transform that into
6 successful policy in the Soviet Union.

7 I think that those of us on the Task Force should not be
8 misled to somehow think we can -- and I agree with what you
9 said, I think you are correct, that just to get the word out
10 to the Soviet Union isn't going to have the same impact. We
11 have a free news press. We have a free news media in the
12 United States. Certainly if you look at the history of the
13 Vietnam conflict, it probably had more to do with us losing
14 the war than what happened in Vietnam, because of the public
15 support that was generated at home.

16 So I think where we have to concentrate is here in the
17 United States to be sure that the American people recognize
18 the moral importance of us supporting people like the
19 Mujahideen, Jonas Svende, other great, gallant Freedom
20 Fighters in different parts of the world, that are in fact
21 fighting for our freedom.

22 I wonder if you would not agree with that, that it is
23 critical that we appreciate it here and from there it will
24 expand, that we can never allow people who are fighting for
25 freedom to feel abandoned and left for not.

1 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Symms, I would like to
2 say that I think perhaps the most striking single aspect of
3 the political history of the period from 1975 to 1980 was the
4 expansion of Soviet influence, client states control, into
5 new areas of the world.

6 I believe that perhaps the most important political
7 event of the last five years may in retrospect turn out to be
8 the growth during this last five-year period of resistance
9 forces to Soviet hegemony, to use that word, that had been
10 established in the previous decades. Those resistance forces
11 represent I believe the determination of peoples to protect
12 their rights to self-determination and national independence,
13 which are guaranteed them by the United Nations Charter and
14 by civilized international relations, and they represent the
15 determinations of people scheduled for incorporation and
16 extinction, really, to preserve their own identity.

17 I think that the growth of the resistance forces and the
18 tenacity of the resistance forces on the Thai border, for
19 example, in the Kampuchean, Cambodian resistance forces, is
20 very striking. When I was in Southeast Asia last year, in
21 China and Southeast Asia, I was very much struck by the
22 repeated assertions and confidence of the people in that
23 region that eventually the Cambodian resistance forces will
24 prevail, that eventually, and that is in a long-range time
25 frame, the Vietnamese will be led to withdraw their occupying

1 forces from Cambodia.

2 I think that the growth of resistance forces in Ethiopia
3 and in Angola and in Mozambique have been very striking and
4 very important political developments in Africa. The
5 development of resistance forces and the growth of resistance
6 forces in Nicaragua is surely one of the most important
7 political facts of the last three years in Central America.

8 I think that the growing effectiveness of the Mujahideen
9 and its increased coordination and operational effectiveness
10 is one of the basic political military facts of Afghanistan
11 in the last two years. And I think that the most striking
12 aspect of all of these facts is that they do demonstrate that
13 conquest of peoples is not inevitable and they do demonstrate
14 the continuation of a will to freedom and self-determination
15 and national independence of peoples, even under the most
16 extraordinarily difficult and terrible of circumstances.

17 Senator Symms. I thank you very much.

18 I would just like to say further, Mr. Chairman, if one
19 looks back at where we were in the middle seventies, when the
20 United States was unwilling to support our friends and oppose
21 our enemies, and we literally jerked the rug out from under
22 the government of South Vietnam and the Cambodian government
23 and left them to dangle and ultimately brought about defeat,
24 we have come a long ways in the last five- or six-year
25 period. I think it is a great improvement.

1 I would hope that we would even see a time we could
2 continue to gain encouragement and those people who are the
3 resistance can gain encouragement that the United States
4 would take it one step further and recognize someone like,
5 for example, a Jonas Svende as the legitimate leader of
6 Angola and give him full diplomatic recognition and say in
7 fact, "You are our friend, you are the leader of Angola, and
8 we hereby recognize you," and make that the legitimate person
9 that we recognize.

10 I think with just one or two examples the whole African
11 continent would fall back to the West.

12 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator, may I comment? I
13 almost forgot, I neglected to mention what is perhaps the
14 most dramatic of all the resistance movements to emerge in
15 the last five years, and that is of course Solidarity. I
16 would like to correct my own record to simply show my
17 profound cognizance and respect for the people of Poland in
18 their determination to assert simply a decent right to manage
19 their own affairs and express themselves.

20 I would like, too, if I may, with regard to your comment
21 on Angola, to say that in retrospect, it seems to me that the
22 action of the Congress through what is called the Clark
23 Amendment, in prohibiting any U.S. assistance to the
24 resistance forces of Angola, constituted nothing more or less
25 than not only the agreement of the United States with the

1 Brezhnev doctrine but a kind of commitment of the United
2 States to become a coenforcer of the Brezhnev doctrine. That
3 is certainly a position which is utterly incompatible with
4 the American commitment to freedom with our tradition of
5 Solidarity, of Freedom Fighters, and with our brothers who
6 fight for their own rights, too, the freedom and
7 self-determination in the world, as President Regan has said.

8 Mr. Ritter. Would the gentleman yield?

9 Senator Symms. Yes.

10 Mr. Ritter. I think it is crucial. In your testimony
11 you talked about the momentum that led the Soviets to believe
12 in this correlation of forces, favorable to invading
13 Afghanistan, the first direct military engagement of the
14 military troops since the Second World War. I mean where
15 else could you epitomize such an action on behalf of the West
16 than in the Clark Amendment in Angola?

17 I thank the gentleman for yielding.

18 Senator Symms. I think that is a very key point. If
19 you look back, this started a long time ago. We had a
20 constant devolution of our willingness to stand with
21 resistance movements.

22 I think President Reagan has been an enormous
23 psychological lift to Freedom Fighters throughout the world
24 by his presence, and last week in his speech where he
25 recognized General Saphe in the audience and said, "I am with

1 you." That means a lot to people around the world. When you
2 look at the cooperation, and you call it compliance, and I
3 forget your word there, with Angola, the same thing was true
4 all through the sixties with respect to Castro. There were
5 people who wanted to have a revolution in Cuba and actually
6 to carry out the commitment of the revolution, much as is
7 going on in Nicaragua today to gain the freedom people were
8 seeking, and the United States always interfered, would never
9 allow those people to resist in Cuba and give them the base
10 of operation. So we in fact protected Castro's building of a
11 Soviet puppet state right in our own back yard because of our
12 failure to support our friends and oppose our enemies.

13 I might point out it was in President Kennedy's speech
14 where that line came from, yet those policies were never
15 carried out during the eight years of the Kennedy-Johnson
16 administration. It continued on through until 1980, a
17 constant devolution of our ability to recognize if we are
18 going to maintain our freedom. If people like the Afghans
19 are going to be able to again gain their freedom back and
20 live in sovereignty, then they must have the moral and
21 material support of the American people. Without it, the
22 world has very little hope. I think with it the world has
23 all the hope that we could expect.

24 I thank you very much and I thank Chairman Humphrey for
25 his efforts to focus attention. There is no place more on

1 the front line for freedom and liberty than Afghanistan. If
2 we won't support them now, God help us. Thank you.

3 Senator Humphrey. Madam Ambassador, if I may refer to
4 your printed testimony, on page 19, you cite the cases of the
5 once independent Muslim states of Khiva and Bokara which are
6 now part of the Soviet Union. Page 19, at the top. We also
7 know, of course, that the other south central parts of the
8 Soviet Union also experienced these same Soviet tactics back
9 in the twenties and thirties, when following the communist
10 revolution the people of that region resisted.

11 What I am getting at here is this question: Do you see
12 these tactics now being employed mercilessly and steadily on
13 a long-term basis in Afghanistan as something new or do they
14 have antecedence in prior and similar campaigns by the
15 Soviets in that region?

16 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think that it is important to
17 face the continuity of the policy in Afghanistan with some
18 previous policies. It is important both to recognize the
19 continuity of Soviet policy in Afghanistan with some previous
20 policies and also, though, to recognize the extent to which
21 it constituted a rupture with the policies of the post World
22 War II period.

23 The Soviet Union underwent, of course, three periods of
24 rapid expansion. The first period was immediately following
25 the conquest of the power by the Bolsheviks after the

1 Bolshevik so-called revolution, which was really a coup
2 d'etat, in which the peoples, for example, of the Ukraine and
3 Bularousia were incorporated and also in 1922 the people of
4 Khiva and Bokara and so forth, the so-called autonomous
5 Soviet socialist republics, many of whom are filled with
6 peoples who would prefer in fact to live --

7 Senator Humphrey. Be autonomous.

8 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. -- would perhaps prefer, in any
9 case, to maintain a more independent status. They didn't
10 have the choice, that is the point. The point is they were
11 incorporated by force.

12 The second period of expansion, of course, came after
13 World War II when the countries of Eastern Europe were, in my
14 opinion, incorporated into the Soviet bloc and integrated
15 into the Soviet rule, not much less because of the Yalta
16 Agreement than because of the presence of the Soviet Red Army
17 in Eastern Europe. And it it was in the shadow of the Red
18 Army that those incorporations took place.

19 The third period of expansion I think came in that 1975
20 through 1979 period which we have been discussing. And I
21 think each of those periods has something in common with the
22 previous one or they have something in common with each
23 other.

24 However, I also think it is important to emphasize that
25 the Soviet leadership has not displayed tendencies towards

1 reckless policy. They have in fact I think displayed
2 characteristics of rather prudent, sober leadership
3 interested in expansion but ready to run only limited risks
4 in the process. And that is why I think it is so terribly
5 important that the invasion of Afghanistan be understood as
6 the first decision of its kind after World War II and as the
7 culmination of a period in which a great deal of Soviet
8 momentum was developed in its expansion.

9 I think it was that momentum which led them to believe
10 that they could in fact expand without paying too high a
11 price or without any very serious consequences. I think it
12 is a terribly important lesson for us to learn because I
13 think it is filled with lessons for us in the conduct of our
14 policy with the Soviet Union. I think if we are strong and
15 clear, then they are not likely, in fact, to run risks for
16 expansion, and that if we are not, they are likely to. I
17 believe this period of '75 through '80 illustrates that fact
18 quite clearly.

19 I also think, though, that we need to be aware of the
20 repeated indications that where the opportunity to do so
21 exists at an apparently low price, they will take advantage
22 of it.

23 Senator Humphrey. Yes. You say this is yet another
24 example of pursuing prudent and nonreckless initiatives.
25 That would seem to suggest that there are some constraints

1 upon the Soviets themselves that they have vulnerabilities
2 themselves. Would you agree with that?

3 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Oh, of course.

4 Senator Humphrey. What are those vulnerabilities to
5 reckless which prevent them from engaging in reckless --
6 there is a difference between reckless and cruel. What they
7 are doing is unspeakably cruel. But they are doing it in a
8 very calculated, long-term, they hope low profile way so as
9 not to play against their own vulnerabilities. What do you
10 see as their own vulnerabilities?

11 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think those vulnerabilities
12 are above all economic and ideological. Economic because the
13 Soviet economy just doesn't work very well. The Soviet model
14 for development is not a model for development. It is in
15 fact a model for failure in economic development. And I
16 think their ideological vulnerability derives above all from
17 the extent to which the reality of the daily lives of Soviet
18 citizens and their own concrete experience does not square
19 with the official interpretations of that experience, which
20 are offered by the Soviet media frequently.

21 So I think those are each very important
22 vulnerabilities, potential vulnerabilities. But I think the
23 Soviet leadership has in fact been realistic in understanding
24 both its own strengths and its own weaknesses and acting in a
25 way that consolidates strength and minimizes costs and risks.

1 Senator Humphrey. We know that the Soviets have not
2 much regard for western public opinion. Do the Soviets care
3 about the public opinion in the Third World and in particular
4 in the Islamic world?

5 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think that the Soviet Union
6 is concerned about public opinion everywhere, including at
7 home, by the way. This is why they spend more money jamming
8 our Voice of America broadcasts or our Radio Liberty
9 broadcasts than we, of course, spend in trying to transmit
10 our messages.

11 I think they care a lot about opinion at home and a lot
12 about opinion in the world. I think their investments, for
13 example, in information and disinformation campaigns in the
14 world are very large, many times ours.

15 One can see, for example, at the United Nations that
16 there is a continuous effort on the part of the Soviet Union
17 to manipulate and control information, all because I think
18 they are terribly interested in influencing public opinion in
19 the United States, in the Third World and, indeed, at home
20 for them.

21 Senator Humphrey. Is there a particular opportunity,
22 however, in the context of this occupation and brutalization
23 of Afghanistan, to use public opinion in the Third World and
24 the Islamic world against the Soviets, to put pressure on
25 them? Is there a particular opportunity here?

1 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Yes and no, Senator Humphrey,
2 in my opinion. I believe that the opportunity exists all the
3 time. I truly believe that the opportunity to inform the
4 Muslim peoples, for example, of Central Asia and of the other
5 parts of the Muslim world about the treatment of minorities
6 in the Soviet Union. The realities of everyday life for
7 Muslims under communism is omnipresent for us. That
8 opportunity exists in every Muslim population all the time,
9 and it is obviously deeply relevant to the struggle.

10 Senator Humphrey. The Soviet goal in Afghanistan, as it
11 was before in south central Soviet Union, is to Sovietize,
12 which means in plain English to destroy the traditional
13 values and to destroy Islam in that part of the Soviet
14 empire. Do you see that as their goal likewise in
15 Afghanistan, to not simply dominate but to Sovietize, to
16 destroy the values and destroy Islam?

17 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Oh, yes. And I think this is
18 manifest in the efforts, deliberate efforts in the
19 transformation of the educational system at all levels that I
20 described and in the control of culture. Absolutely
21 manifest.

22 Senator Humphrey. Is the Soviet Union not the most
23 anti-Islamic nation in the world in terms of invasion and
24 persecution?

25 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think it is quite clear that

1 the Marxist-Leninist systems and those associated with the
2 Soviet Union demonstrate a continuing and nearly implacable
3 hostility to religions of all kinds.

4 Senator Humphrey. All right. Is there anything new,
5 Madam Ambassador, in the use by the Soviets of famine to
6 achieve their ends of Sovietization and subjugation and
7 incorporation?

8 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think it was the Ukrainian
9 famine, which has been described as the first manmade famine
10 in human history, that Ukrainian famine which was, of course,
11 an important tactic in the incorporation of the Ukraine into
12 the Soviet Union, was perhaps the first deliberate use of
13 famine and starvation as an instrument of political policy.
14 I think the expansion of that to the decollectivization
15 strategy during the collectivization drive under Stalin
16 provides another example of the deliberate use of starvation
17 as a political instrument. And, of course, today I think we
18 see in Ethiopia some effort at the use of what might be
19 called food as a weapon and starvation as an instrument of
20 policy.

21 So the concept of using starvation as an instrument for
22 the consolidation of control over populations is by no means
23 a new one.

24 Senator Humphrey. By the Soviets.

25 Just a comment, not a question. No response is

1 necessary or even asked. But I find it ironic that this week
2 the White House entertained Vladimir Sharminsky, who is
3 credited or accused perhaps I should say, of being
4 responsible for organizing the famine and the suffering of
5 the people of the Ukraine, in the very week when an Afghan
6 Freedom Fighter, Commander Abdul Hauk, a genuine hero,
7 visited the White House and was not permitted to see the
8 President.

9 I think speaking of public policy, public diplomacy, I
10 should say no better example exists of the ineffective and
11 half-hearted public policy efforts by the Administration than
12 the example I have just cited.

13 Madam Ambassador, one last question. I want to again
14 focus on this matter of whether the Soviets are bogged down
15 or whether in fact their strategy is succeeding. Some say
16 that because the Freedom Fighters control 80 percent of the
17 country, that shows that they are winning and the Soviets are
18 losing. Do the Soviets in fact have a strategy that requires
19 or, indeed, seeks to control most of the countryside or is
20 their strategy limited to controlling strategic facilities
21 such as power plants and radio transmitters and things of
22 that kind on the one hand while destroying through carpet
23 bombing and every measure of terror the ability of the
24 resistance to continue? Do the Soviets have a strategy to
25 control that covers the entire countryside? Does it matter

1 they they control only 20 percent?

2 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. It matters in the short range
3 sense but it doesn't matter in the long range if the strategy
4 is indeed, as many observers believe, to control urban areas
5 and strategic facilities within urban areas and outside them,
6 while rubbleizing, while driving millions of Afghans out of
7 the countryside and transforming the Afghan way of life
8 throughout the country. As long as there is a long-range
9 time frame of the sort I have emphasized I think the Soviets
10 have, then I think that it is necessary to face the fact that
11 that strategy may work in the long run, even though it seems
12 that the Soviets make only very limited progress in the short
13 run.

14 Now I would like to emphasize, too, that I don't think
15 that success is inevitable. I am quite certain it is not.

16 Senator Humphrey, since I am here as a member of the
17 Administration, may I please comment on your comment about
18 the President's receiving --

19 Senator Humphrey. Certainly. It wasn't my wish to put
20 you in an awkward spot.

21 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I would like to say that I
22 believe really quite sincerely that there are special
23 problems associated with the choice that you described about
24 whom the President would see and whom he would not see. I
25 believe that Mr. Sharminsky was here as an official and very

1 high level representative of the Soviet government, and it is
2 important that the United States have decorous relations with
3 the Soviet government.

4 We are not in a position to choose those
5 representatives. It is the Soviet government who chooses
6 them. It was suggested, for example, that Premier Andropov
7 was responsible for the assassination plot against the Pope
8 and a good deal of evidence pointed in that direction, and
9 yet it would have been necessary, had the occasion presented
10 itself, for the United States certainly to receive him.

11 I think one has to see people in those roles as ex
12 officio simply. However unpleasant that may be, I think that
13 is a necessity in the relations among nations.

14 I think also that in relationship to the President's
15 receiving Afghan Freedom Fighters and their commanders, I
16 would like to make two points. One, it is very well
17 understood that the President fully supports in his personal
18 sympathy those Freedom Fighters. He has very great empathy,
19 solidarity and admiration for them. And second, it is also
20 complicated by the fact, as you know, you are more sensitive
21 to than I perhaps even, that the United States has diplomatic
22 relations with the government of Afghanistan and that creates
23 a sensitive situation.

24 Senator Humphrey. I would love to engage you in a
25 debate on this matter. I don't want to. Let me announce

1 when we invited Ambassador Kirkpatrick some months ago, it
2 was anticipated by both sides by now she would be once again
3 a private citizen. So I don't wish to place you in a more
4 awkward position than I might have already, unwittingly. So
5 I will just let it drop for the moment at this forum.

6 Congressman Ritter.

7 Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 The American people have spoken on this subject. Their
9 representatives in the Senate and in the House have passed
10 what is known as the Tsongas-Ritter Resolution which
11 encompasses some language to the effect that the
12 Administration should effectively assist the Afghan Freedom
13 Fighters.

14 In order to make the American people more aware of what
15 is happening in Afghanistan and some of the details as it
16 impacts them, what would you suggest? It is obvious, or is
17 it, that our defense expenditures would be magnified if all
18 of a sudden there was a Sovietized Afghanistan holding that
19 high ground above South Asia a few days from Gwadar and
20 through Palishistan, with ten airfields at present. How can
21 we better get the message across to the American people of
22 not only this moral, not only humanitarian, but really almost
23 self-serving geostrategic long-range historic importance?

24 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Congressman Ritter, I think
25 that is a very important point that is present in your

1 question. It is very important, I think, that the American
2 people be aware and informed about the extent to which
3 foreign policy decisions made today impact on our security
4 situation and on our defense budgets and on our alliance
5 structures in subsequent years.

6 I think that it is certainly true that a fully
7 consolidated Sovietized Afghanistan would, as I indicated in
8 my statement, have profound implications and deeply negative
9 consequences for the stability and security of the region,
10 potentially. Again, not inevitably but potentially.
11 Certainly it would have important implications for the
12 defense and security system for the region. Certainly it
13 would be expensive to us.

14 I suggested, if I may say, without changing the subject,
15 that it would be useful if someone would try to estimate what
16 the cost has been in dollars and cents to the United States
17 of the presence of an expansionist Sandinista government in
18 Nicaragua the past five years. That cost is in billions
19 already. So far as I know, no one has estimated that cost
20 simply in dollars and cents, regardless of its cost to
21 security and human misery.

22 The cost in dollars and cents, as well as in human
23 misery and security, of a fully Sovietized Afghanistan would
24 certainly be very high.

25 I think it is terribly important that these problems be

1 shared with the American people. Terribly important.

2 These are not, in my opinion, questions of foreign
3 policy most appropriately confined to discussion in closed
4 rooms by a few experts. These are questions of foreign
5 policy which have the most profound implications for American
6 taxpayers and American citizens in years to come. They
7 deserve to share the problem and the information and the
8 decision with the rest of us.

9 Mr. Ritter. Thank you. In terms of the possibilities
10 of diplomatic pressure, although one wonders why a Muslim
11 Third World nation even talks to the Soviet Union, given what
12 the Soviets have done to a brother Muslim nation, but given
13 the possibilities of diplomatic pressure, what is the quid
14 pro quo that the Soviets get for withdrawal, given the
15 long-term digging in of their policy, the 10,000 children to
16 the Soviet Union, the policy of enforced rubbleization,
17 destruction of the infrastructure? What do the Soviets get
18 other than walking away from a fight with a bloody nose?

19 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think that the Soviet Union,
20 which is, after all, a society with the most widely diverse
21 ethnic composition, and a very large Muslim population, and a
22 large number of Muslim nations, the Soviet Union by accepting
23 the kind of settlement provided in the UN resolution could
24 win better relations with all their neighbors, greater
25 respect for the world, relations with her neighbors based not

1 simply on intimidation or mutual intimidation or fear but
2 relations based on cooperation and genuine respect.

3 In the long run, if we looked at a still longer run time
4 frame, the Soviet Union itself might profit by such relations
5 with the government, in relations with her own Muslim
6 population, and with her Muslim neighbors. Certainly the
7 peace of the world would be enhanced. Certainly the Soviets
8 stand to gain by that as well as all the rest of us.

9 Mr. Ritter. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would like to
10 believe that and I know a lot of people would like to believe
11 that that were a possibility. I guess what I would caution
12 either the American people or the rest of the world is seeing
13 that eventuality emerge prominently on the horizon in the
14 near future.

15 I think, as you stated, the model for economic
16 development promoted by the Soviet Union is a model for Third
17 World failure, and that the alternative course that they take
18 perhaps is precisely because their economic model is so
19 disastrous, and that this is their alternative as a power in
20 the world today; that if we expect them to somehow deny their
21 only successes, we may be waiting a very long time.

22 There was one other point, the death of Chernenko
23 promoting the possibility of something happening over
24 Afghanistan. I don't want to rain on anybody's parade, but
25 the times of succession in the Soviet Union have always been

1 marked by jockeying and solidification of power bases. What
2 is happening in the party regions and who is supporting whom?

3 It is, I think, a period of pronounced status quo, but
4 the possibility of someone once established coming up with
5 another posture is finite, although given what we have
6 learned, probably small. The only real possibility in my
7 mind, after following this for five years, having lived in
8 the Soviet Union, having studied the Russian language,
9 culture, literature, music, the only real possibility is
10 upping the ante for Soviet forces in Afghanistan. And that
11 is a grim possibility, but probably the only realistic one.

12 I know that sounds like a speech, but you can get
13 sidetracked out of mainstreams. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.

14 Senator Humphrey. Madam Ambassador, we are very
15 grateful for your presence here today and that you might come
16 and lend your expertise to this important matter. We are
17 also, as always, impressed by your forthright nature. Thank
18 you very much.

19 Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Senator,
20 Congressman.

21 Senator Humphrey. While the Ambassador is leaving, we
22 will call our next panel to the table, please.

23 (Brief recess.)

24 Senator Humphrey. May we have order, please.

25 Our next witnesses on the agenda printed are Alex

1 Alexiev, Social Scientist and Consultant for the Rand
2 Corporation, who is appearing on his own behalf; Yossef
3 Bodansky, a Soviet military expert; and Dr. Thomas
4 E. Gouttierre, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of
5 Nebraska at Omaha.

6 We will begin with Mr. Gouttierre. You don't have a
7 huge statement here, do you? You may proceed as you wish,
8 please. Mr. Alexiev is absent so you start first.

9 STATEMENTS OF ALEX ALEXIEV, SOCIAL SCIENTIST,
10 RAND CORPORATION; YOSSEF BODANSKY, SOVIET
11 MILITARY EXPERT; DR. THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE,
12 CENTER FOR AFGHANISTAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF
13 NEBRASKA AT OMAHA

14 Dr. Gouttierre. I am going to start by first of all
15 commending you, Senator Humphrey, and also Congressman Ritter
16 for your parts in seeing that these hearings are held.

17 I think that as you addressed us all earlier, you
18 indicated the importance, and it has been reiterated in the
19 statements made by Ambassador Kirkpatrick and others of your
20 colleagues, that the public awareness of what is going on in
21 Afghanistan is something that is very, very important to all
22 of us in terms of what we might expect in the future relating
23 to this war.

24 I think that through five years those of us long
25 associated with the war in Afghanistan were dismayed that

1 there was really no public awareness. I think the last year
2 has seen a tremendous increase in the public interest and
3 awareness of what is going on in Afghanistan. And I
4 personally am most pleased to see this develop because I
5 recognize and recognized years ago this was to be a very
6 important part of the whole equation relating to Afghanistan.

7 I think that in studying the situation on Afghanistan,
8 and I know my two fellow panel members will be taking a look
9 at matters relating to the Soviet strategy and the Soviet
10 military tactics in Afghanistan, I wanted to, of course,
11 focus on the Afghan quotient itself.

12 I think that most of us are now well aware of the
13 country of Afghanistan and the Afghan people. We recognize
14 them today as a very brave people, a people who are doing the
15 kinds of things that perhaps the Czechs and the Hungarians
16 and also Poles in years not too distant in our past have
17 failed to be able to accomplish. They are fighting with a
18 tenacity that I think is unparalleled in recent memory.

19 And there are many models that are constructed, many
20 examples that are used about the way countries on the
21 periphery of the Soviet Union, whether they were in the
22 Caucasian area or whether they were in Mongolia or in Central
23 Asia and the way in which they were subjugated by the Soviet
24 Union.

25 I think many of these models have interesting examples.

1 But I think that they depart from the reality of Afghanistan.
2 The environmental and cultural differences I think are
3 significant.

4 Today I am going to focus just briefly on some of these
5 differences and why I feel they are very important in
6 considering the situation in Afghanistan and the eventual
7 devolution there.

8 I think today you are able to find individuals who will
9 say essentially the war is over, that the Soviets are now
10 consolidating their position in Afghanistan and will continue
11 to do that into the future. People who cite these particular
12 kinds of things would like to point out that the cost to the
13 Soviet Union itself in Afghanistan is not significant enough
14 to encourage them to depart.

15 I think that there is a very strong element of truth in
16 that. But I think also we must take a look very decidedly at
17 the Afghan quotient itself. I think most people when they
18 talk about resolution of a situation in Afghanistan, when
19 they talk about the factors that are important in bringing
20 about an end to the situation in Afghanistan, the war in
21 Afghanistan, talk often about a big power situation, the
22 Soviet Union itself and its commitment, and there is very
23 little understanding of the strengths that the Afghans
24 themselves bring to this war.

25 I have prepared, as you know, a paper for the hearing

1 here, and I am not going to use that in my remarks. I am
2 going to just point out a number of the salient factors that
3 I wish to address at this opportunity.

4 I think the primary negative factors that are
5 influencing the situation in Afghanistan as it relates to the
6 Afghans themselves are certainly numerous. There is some
7 success in the Sovietization campaign, not certainly as
8 successful as the Soviets would themselves wish. But if one
9 takes a look at historical evolution as a way of
10 Sovietization of Afghanistan from the very beginning, from
11 the assistance to the Afghan government and infiltration both
12 in the bureaucratic and economic sectors as well as the
13 military, one can see a ragtag pattern and one can also see a
14 pattern emerging that would provide for even a further
15 Sovietization.

16 I think Congressman Ritter pointed out very accurately
17 the Soviet strategy of depopulation. I think that particular
18 strategy is a very key element to the whole Soviet approach
19 and that the success of Sovietization itself will be very
20 dependent on that.

21 One might also take a look at the apparent disunity of
22 the Afghan groups as a negative factor. One might also take
23 a look at the fact that within Afghanistan itself, the lack
24 of communication between the resistance groups, though
25 increasing, still remains somewhat of a negative factor.

1 The fact there has been no real opportunity or move
2 towards the development of a government in exile for the
3 Afghans, the inability to come to some kind of agreement on
4 that point, has to be taken into context as a negative
5 factor.

6 I think perhaps the most negative factor relating to the
7 potential of the Afghans to resist into the future is the
8 economic weaknesses that are developing and that people have
9 already addressed here that have to do with the scorched
10 earth tactics you both mentioned. These certainly provide
11 for the long-term future of the Afghans a tremendous
12 challenge to all of us who are concerned about the outcome of
13 this war.

14 I think we need very much to look into this. I know
15 that your previous hearings did. I hope that this particular
16 aspect, in other words the humanitarian concerns, combatting
17 the scorched earth tactics that have been used, also looking
18 into the need for education and medicine as well, will not be
19 a matter that will have only passing interest.

20 Finally, I think in terms of those things that are
21 having a negative impact on the Afghan ability to persist in
22 this resistance, the Soviet strategies and tactics themselves
23 are becoming more and more successful. I am not saying again
24 that the war is over as a result or that the Soviets have
25 won. But there is certainly evidence that the Soviet tactics

1 are having that kind of impact that Congressman Ritter
2 pointed out in terms of the depopulation and the migratory
3 genocide. These are certainly in the long term factors which
4 would I think bear some advantage to the Soviets themselves.

5 But now let me just set those aside and let Yossef and
6 Mr. Alexiev address these more in the future in their
7 presentations. I would like to take a look quickly at some
8 of the very positive factors.

9 I think we need to understand that the Afghans bring to
10 this war factors which are very positive in their ability to
11 sustain the resistance. These are factors that don't exist
12 in all of the other examples and models that people like to
13 call upon, whether they be in the Caucasian area or whether
14 they be in Central Asia or in Mongolia.

15 I think, for example, to take a look at one of these
16 historical factors, the Afghans take a look at history as
17 they perceive it themselves, not necessarily as it was lived.
18 They tend to feel themselves as having prevailed over other
19 imperialist efforts or attempts at their country during the
20 nineteen hundreds and early part of this century. People
21 don't tend in Afghanistan to look over the specific details
22 of the three Afghan wars but they tend to remember those as
23 wars in which they have prevailed.

24 That myth, whether it is fact or fiction, is one that
25 the Afghans themselves carry into this war. It is a very

1 important part of their historical culture as they go into
2 this battle. It is one that I think wasn't necessarily
3 available in many of the other kinds of resistance movements
4 which have been waged against the Russians, whether they be
5 Czarist or Soviet in the past.

6 Environmental factors, I think these are very important,
7 too. When you take a look at Central Asia, you see
8 essentially a landscape which is much more conducive to use
9 of armies, tanks, and things of this nature, rather than
10 perhaps that which we see in Afghanistan. The valleys and
11 mountains and caves and the kind of living structure which
12 the Afghans have relied on for years I think in many ways
13 form a very positive factor in this particular equation.

14 The social institutions of the Afghans, particularly the
15 strong family institutions, the tribal institutions, these
16 are hard to penetrate in terms of trying to subdue or to try
17 to overcome through Sovietization. I think that when one
18 takes a look at the attempts by the Soviets to penetrate
19 Afghanistan, particularly in the last three decades, one has
20 seen that most of the penetration has been at the military
21 and urban levels and not in the village and tribal areas, the
22 family and tribal areas, which I think are very, very
23 important.

24 There is a personal character which the Afghans bring to
25 this war, one in which they glorify the image of the poet

1 warrior, one that again draws upon this historical culture
2 which I think the Afghans readily utilize as a resource in
3 their commitment to this fight, and as well the cultural
4 traditions which are a part of this.

5 The political institutions in Afghanistan are ones which
6 most people denigrate. They tend to see Afghanistan as a
7 ragtag country of tribal groupings that have fought
8 throughout their long history. People are not aware of the
9 fact that there is a certain sophisticated democratic
10 approach to resolving regional, local and tribal differences.

11 The Afghans have built up a culture of learning how to
12 accommodate and to reach compromise. They have even
13 developed certain institutional elements of a governmental
14 nature which, although they may be opposed to strong central
15 government, still has its own institutional composition.

16 These are important to understand, that in dealing with
17 the Afghans, we are not talking about an unsophisticated
18 group of ragtag bandits, as the Soviets present them, as the
19 western press primarily characterizes them, as uncivilized
20 rebels.

21 I think this is not the case, that there is much more
22 cultural sophistication, political sophistication, both in
23 the village culture in the north and the also the tribal
24 culture of the south and southeast.

25 The current politics in Afghanistan certainly also

1 constitute a positive element in this whole think. The
2 Afghan Communist Party, the Peoples Democratic Party of
3 Afghanistan, has been unable to come together no matter what
4 the prodding from the Soviets. These things are falling
5 primarily along traditional lines.

6 This is not a devolution relating to current political
7 considerations but these are related to things that are
8 traditional, that have to do with tribal and linguistic
9 things as much as other factors.

10 The economic institutions of Afghanistan are also
11 another positive element in this whole equation. We tend to
12 point out the economic weaknesses that are caused by Soviet
13 scorched earth tactics, but also we have to remember that for
14 Afghan and that is a serious weakness.

15 But we also have to remember on the positive side of
16 that ledger that the Afghan economy has been strongly
17 agrarian -- it is not dependent upon the collapse of the
18 urban economy which has been building recently in Afghanistan --
19 and that the Afghans have the strength and the strategy,
20 essentially, and their long history and cultural approach to
21 economy that will help them I think be able to combat these
22 scorched earth tactics of the Soviet Union. They need
23 additional external support, but I think this is also very
24 important.

25 Religion obviously is a very positive element in this

1 whole equation. I think that the fact that many people bring
2 to focus that the Afghans are not all Suni but some are
3 Shiite, or whatever, is not as important as the fact that
4 there is a commonality in the cultural practice of religion
5 in Afghanistan and the fact that in Afghanistan, Islam is as
6 much a cultural way of life as it is just a religious way of
7 life. It is a very important part of the strength of the
8 Afghan people, that the differences that one might like to
9 focus upon relating to being either Shiite or Suni are not as
10 significant here as the cultural similarities.

11 Senator Humphrey. I would have to ask you to wind it
12 up.

13 Dr. Gouttierre. I am nearly finished. Just a last
14 couple of important elements.

15 In taking a look at this, the external aid the Afghans
16 have been receiving is certainly something that is positive.
17 I hope and I have confidence that in the near future this
18 particular element will be increasing.

19 Finally, I think that it is important to take a look at
20 what the Afghans themselves are trying to obtain by their
21 long-term fight. I think that they are realistic enough to
22 understand that the war in Afghanistan would have to include
23 a definition of U.S.S.R. security interests vis-a-vis
24 Afghanistan. But they are determined that no resolution of
25 this war would include the defining of the nature of the

1 government in Afghanistan.

2 I think this is a very important thing that we need to
3 keep in mind. The Afghans again have been fighting a war for
4 five years. This particular fight has sophisticated them in
5 their understanding of how to approach a resolution of this
6 war. They are utilizing those particular resources that are
7 at hand for them and that are not easy to find in other
8 models that have been combatting the Soviets in the past.
9 And I think that these are things that we need to take into
10 constant consideration.

11 My greatest fear is that the swinging pendulum of
12 American politics, which is very much swinging in favor of
13 the Afghans today, and the concern about resistance movements
14 against Soviet imperialism around the world, will swing back
15 again. I think that the Afghans themselves are as concerned
16 about that particular element as anything else.

17 Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

18 (The statement follows:)
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 Senator Humphrey. Let me interrupt the procedure here
2 for a few minutes. I want to acknowledge a statement which
3 will be entered into the record in an appropriate place by
4 Congressman Robert Lagomarsino, a valued member of this Task
5 Force, who is absent today for necessary reasons, who would
6 have been here had the Congress been in session today.

7 (The statement follows:)

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 Senator Humphrey. Likewise, I want to refer to these
2 charts, since a member of my staff went to great trouble to
3 make these up over the weekend, even sleeping on my couch in
4 my office, I am told.

5 Dr. Ron Sinocoff is our cartologist. Ron, will you come
6 up and use the pointer or smething while I read this
7 statement?

8 Afghanistan is located at the crossroads of South Asia
9 and its strategic location has forced Afghan people for
10 centuries to ward off encroaching invaders. Its borders
11 stand in the way of long held Far East and Soviet quests for
12 a warm water port on the Arabian Sea.

13 Stretching across the vast expansion of western Pakistan
14 and eastern Iran is land inhabited by some 500 Baluchi
15 tribesmen called Baluchistan. A look at this map clearly
16 indicates the extreme importance of Baluchistan, which
17 commands greater than 900 miles of the Arabian Sea.
18 Baluchistan is also a region of strong Soviet influence which
19 has been nurtured over the past two decades.

20 Southern Afghanistan and Baluchistan form a natural land
21 corridor to the Arabian Sea where topographic relief is
22 minimal when compared to northern Afghanistan.

23 This land corridor would provide the Soviets with easy
24 access to their long cherished warm water port in the Arabian
25 Sea, were they to succeed in conquering Afghanistan.

1 To further appreciate the strategic importance of
2 Afghanistan, one need only look at Afghanistan's close
3 proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic chokepoint
4 for the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the West and
5 Japan.

6 Over the past few years the Soviets have fortified their
7 strategic infrastructure inside Afghanistan, expanding and
8 building new air bases. A MIG 25 reconnaissance jet leaving
9 from a number of air bases in southern Afghanistan could run
10 a single overflight reconnaissance in the Persian Gulf and
11 return to Afghanistan within two hours. A fighter aircraft
12 could perform a strike mission in the Persian Gulf within the
13 same time period.

14 With addition of tankers, these same aircraft and others
15 could perform long-term surveillance and air strikes in the
16 Persian Gulf.

17 Additionally, the ability to conduct military operations
18 out of Afghanistan would reduce Soviet dependence on their
19 naval forces in the Indian and Arabian Sea.

20 Thank you, Dr. Sinocoff.

21 Let me say also that I have read in full the statements
22 of each of our witnesses, and I thank you for submitting them
23 ahead of time. That is a great help.

24 I hope, however, that especially in the case of
25 Mr. Bodansky, you are not going to treat us to a recitation

1 of your entire statement since it is quite lengthy. I have
2 read it in its entirety and have underlined certain portions,
3 as I have in the case of other testimony, and intend to ask
4 you about it. But I wish that you would give us a briefer
5 synopsis.

6 Mr. Bodansky. Thank you, Senator Humphrey. I would
7 like to address the whole problem of Soviet perception of the
8 issue. From their perspective, the current Soviet activities
9 in Afghan are a direct evolution of the age-old Russian
10 imperialism.

11 The relentless advance into Asia emerged from the
12 struggle of the Slavic population for fertile lands and has
13 eventually become the focal point of the Russian and Soviet
14 expansionism and imperialism. The Russians and Soviets have
15 perceived their advance into Central Asia as the only means
16 short of a major confrontation in Europe in which their
17 land-based military might can be translated into tangible
18 strategic gains.

19 Since the mid-1820s, the Russians have believed that the
20 European powers would acquiesce to any occupation of a
21 Central Asian country because such a country was not worthy
22 of a European war. The Soviet nomenklatura wants victory,
23 not war. The Soviets are determined to continue their
24 historic consolidation of power through the persistent drive
25 into Asia.

1 Senator Humphrey. I am sorry; your voice is still not
2 carrying. Your testimony is very important. So excuse me
3 for interrupting, but pull the microphone closer, please.

4 Mr. Bodansky. As a result of the bitter legacy of the
5 Mongol invasion, the great Russians have always perceived
6 their struggle with the Turkic population of Central Asia in
7 terms of KTO-KOGO, or who gets whom. In such a struggle
8 there can be no compromises or even pauses. The Muslim Turks
9 and the Russians have been in contact for a thousand years,
10 during which time relations have been mostly hostile. Any
11 attempt to find yet another "peaceful" solution, whether
12 based on Marxism-Leninism or not, is feared by both sides.

13 The Russian and Soviet advance into Central and
14 Southwest Asia is the expression of the quest for power by
15 the ruling elite. The legacy of the "Tatar Yoke" has
16 determined the ferocity and persistence of the Russian and
17 Soviet drive into Asia.

18 The essence of the Russian and Soviet military strategy
19 has been the rapid consolidation of control over the local
20 strategic objectives, and only then the beginning of a
21 lengthy and gradual submission of the local Muslim
22 population.

23 The Russians have always adhered to the Kazakh proverb:
24 "It takes 50 years to remold a people." The current Soviet
25 activities in Afghanistan clearly indicate that the Soviet

goals and priorities have not changed. On the basis of the accumulating Russian and Soviet experience since the early 18th century, they define the preconditions for the occupation of Muslim territories and the suppression of the local insurrection and resistance:

(1) The destruction of the local leadership, and especially its ability to achieve unity.

(2) The erosion of popular bases through the destruction of the local social and economical infrastructure.

(3) The effective isolation of the region.

The application of these preconditions is the key to the current Soviet success in Afghanistan.

The Soviet primary goals in Afghanistan are maintaining and securing their power-projection strategic infrastructure, securing a showcase safe Kabul, and the prevention of escalation of the resistance activities from Pakistan.

The Soviets themselves admit that they do not control the entire country and have not attempted to capture it. The Soviets claim control over only 25 percent of the territory, concede that the resistance controls 10 percent, and define the rest, 65 percent, as being no-man's-land.

This Soviet definition reflects the current situation in Afghanistan fairly accurately. Thus, the Russian and Soviet military strategy has been formulated to facilitate only the rapid consolidation of control over the militarily

significant infrastructure, denying it to their enemy, rather than to control the entire territory and pacify the local population.

Since 1978 there have been three major Soviet decisionmaking events in which the Soviet-Afghan policy was determined.

(1) Spring of 1978 -- the recognition of Afghanistan as a socialist state and the extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine to it.

(2) Spring of 1980 -- the realization that Soviet forces have to remain in Afghanistan indefinitely and that the main goal for their deployment is to further Soviet strategic and global interests.

(3) Winter of 1983-1984 -- the realization that Afghanistan is a developing traditionalist Muslim society and that the intensifying Muslim insurrection might become a threat to the stability of the Muslim population of the U.S.S.R.

The essence of these perceptions of Afghanistan is the key to understanding the Soviet approach to Afghanistan and to Central and Southwest Asia as a whole.

The Soviets considered the invasion as a further development of a predetermined process. The Soviet forces

1 that entered Afghanistan were organized for a brief stay
2 among a friendly and safe population, which was not the case.

3 As of mid-1980, the resistance could not prevent the
4 Soviets from doing whatever they wanted in Afghanistan,
5 provided they were willing to pay the price. Professor
6 Rabbani, the leader of Jamiat-i-Islami, admitted that "The
7 Soviets feel comfortable in Afghanistan." At the height of
8 routine military operations, only 15 percent of the Soviet
9 troops in Afghanistan were committed to fighting the
10 resistance.

11 As with the rest of the highly successful Russian and
12 Soviet subversion activities among Muslim nationalities and
13 ethnical groups in the last 200 years, the current Soviet
14 campaign is based on an indigenous rift with a long heritage
15 of enmities and flareups, but it is completely distorted in
16 order to further Soviet designs.

17 Soviet covert and propaganda operations play a crucial
18 role in this campaign. The Soviet efforts range from the
19 spread of mutual suspicion and mistrust between segments of
20 the Afghan population to the running and manipulating of
21 complete resistance organizations.

22 The essence of the Soviet acceptance of the
23 artificiality and futility of the "Saur Revolution" is the
24 realization that the Afghan population did not undergo the
25 brief monumental event that can transform nationalities from

1 one status to another; namely, a revolution.

2 Thus, in the current not-yet-socialist state of the
3 Afghan nationalities, they perceive and define their identity
4 in accordance with similar expressions of everyday life;
5 namely, religion, language and cultural behavior.

6 According to the Soviet definition, the nationalities of
7 northern Afghanistan have more in common with their brethren
8 north of the Amu-Daraya than with these south of the
9 Hindu-Kush. The Soviets emphasize that the boundaries of
10 ethnic territories correspond to the social and economic
11 history. Consequently, they believe that long-range
12 stability will be achieved only in the wake of a regional
13 solution.

14 The Soviet long-term strategy should not be confused
15 with the ongoing military strategy which addresses specific
16 challenges in Afghanistan. The Soviet military strategy
17 helps to facilitate the eventual attainment of the long-term
18 strategy. The Soviet long-term solutions are regional and,
19 thus, include the dismemberment or destruction of Pakistan.

20 The current Soviet approach to the means and methods
21 with which to deal with the Afghan resistance is identical to
22 the classic solutions of the Central Asian problems of the
23 last 150 years. It is the realization of the futility of
24 socialist solutions, the confronting of the Afghan realities,
25 and the willingness to adopt and pursue not only the classic

1 Russian and Soviet goals and aspirations, but also the classic
2 Russian and Soviet socio-military solutions, that makes the
3 Soviets so devastatingly effective against the Afghan
4 resistance.

5 In 1985 the Soviet Union is closer than ever before to a
6 total victory in the great game.

7 On the basis of the cumulative Russian and Soviet
8 experience, the Soviets define the following military
9 preconditions as the key to success in fighting against and
10 the suppression of the Muslim insurgency:

11 (1) deep intelligence penetration and manipulation of
12 the
13 hostile population.

14 (2) deep raiding capabilities and the ability to conduct
15 surgical
16 strikes against priority objectives.

17 (3) the ability to rapidly inflict massive collateral
18 damage to
19 the civilian infrastructure in order to erode the popular
20 support.

21 The Russian and Soviet conduct of military operations in
22 Central Asia since the emergence of the modern Russian and
23 Soviet armed forces at the end of the 18th century, in which
24 the validity of these preconditions has been repeatedly
25 demonstrated and proven, can be divided into three major

1 periods:

2 (1) the formulation of the operational art (1780s-1916).

3 (2) the integration of the techno-tactical aspects of
4 mechanization into the operational art (1917-1945).

5 (3) the introduction of flexible and automated troop
6 control

7 and autonomous small unit combat operations into the
8 operational art and tactics (1980).

9 The Russian and Soviet military approach to the conduct
10 of counter insurgency combat operations called for three key
11 elements: the operational flexibility and autonomy of the
12 small unit, the availability of superior and flexible fire
13 power (including the use of chemical weapons), and a complete
14 intelligence picture.

15 The moment the Soviets succeeded in integrating these
16 three key elements, the resistance started to suffer serious
17 defeats. The goal in the conduct of special operations is to
18 put the subversive organization constantly on the defensive
19 through a series of devastating surprise strikes on its very
20 deep sanctuaries.

21 In accordance with their traditional strategy, Soviet
22 forces in Afghanistan do not attempt to pacify the areas in
23 which they encounter resistance. When a village is known to
24 be actively cooperating with the resistance, or that there is
25 an active resistance group among the population, the Soviets

1 use special forces or the KDB (Punitive Desant Battalion) to
2 destroy the entire village in order not to give away
3 intelligence assets and in order to demonstrate to the
4 resistance that the Soviet special forces can get them
5 everywhere and by surprise.

6 The Soviets have made special efforts to penetrate the
7 most conservative, traditionalist sectors of the populations.
8 They seem to have an accurate picture of the situation of the
9 resistance at any given moment. The Soviets also rely on
10 their excellent intelligence penetration fo the resistance to
11 conduct deep raids into sanctuaries of the resistance. These
12 raids are usually conducted in order to seize newly-arrived
13 weapons and supplies before they are disseminated to
14 resistance forces and in order to capture or assassinate
15 effective resistance commanders.

16 The most significant special operations are these
17 conducted by SPETSNAZ 3-man teams in the deep rear of the
18 enemy. There are also quite a few cases when a resistance
19 commander, who was a KhAD agent, led his entire force
20 knowingly into a devastatingly effective Soviet-DRA ambush
21 and then joined the DRA forces.

22 History shows that the turning point in the Russian and
23 Soviet struggle for the control of Muslim territories has
24 been when they succeeded to effectively isolate the
25 population and sever the external support to the local

1 resistance. The cumulative effect of the Soviet special
2 operations has brought the population to a breaking point and
3 total collapse while the manner in which the Western
4 assistance is disseminated amounts to the virtual isolation
5 of the Afghan resistance.

6 Taken together, these two trends constitute the key to
7 the Soviet success. If the current trend continues,
8 Afghanistan can be written off by the West, probably within
9 months, and the Soviets will be encouraged to continue their
10 persistent advance towards the warm waters and the Near East.

11 The Soviet Union is currently winning in Afghanistan.
12 It has virtually crushed the resistance militarily and is on
13 its way to attaining total victory. This will happen in the
14 very near future providing the U.S. assistance does not
15 become more effective.

16 The Afghan resistance has already demonstrated its
17 commitment to its struggle by continuing to fight while
18 enduring the Soviet atrocities. The Soviets have been
19 effectively employing the proven Russian strategies.
20 Effective assistance to the resistance will prevent its
21 isolation, thus denying the Soviets total victory.

22 The escalation of the struggle in Afghanistan is bound
23 to have long-term influence on the Soviet empire. Although
24 the decision to pursue regional rather than national
25 solutions led Soviets to be more pragmatic and effective, it

1 has also exposed the Soviet Muslim population to outside
2 influence and subversion because northern Afghanistan is now
3 closer to the U.S.S.R. Central Asians have learned that a
4 socialist revolution can be reversed. Afghanistan will not
5 be lost if the U.S. assistance becomes effective, and soon.

6 Thank you.

7 Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

8 (The statement follows:)

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 Senator Humphrey. Mr. Alexiev?

2 Mr. Alexiev. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 The Soviet strategy for winning the war in Afghanistan,
4 now in its sixth year, has, in my opinion, become
5 increasingly obvious. It is a comprehensive strategy
6 designed to subdue the Afghan people at the lowest possible
7 military, political and economic cost to the Soviets.

8 The military dimension of this strategy has aimed
9 primarily to intimidate and terrorize the population in
10 resistance-controlled areas into withdrawing support from the
11 Mujahideen or leaving the area. It has not sought a purely
12 solely military defeat of the resistance probably because the
13 Soviets realize that such an attempt would entail massive
14 costs and no certainty of success.

15 The Soviet military investment, therefore, at some two
16 to three percent of the overall military manpower, and
17 military expenditures and about 10,000 killed has remained
18 both limited and tolerable.

19 As part of its overall strategy, Moscow has placed a
20 much greater emphasize, in my opinion, on economic and
21 political warfare, on the correct assumption that defeating
22 the resistance in these two areas would also bring about its
23 military collapse.

24 Economically, the Soviets have pursued the destruction
25 of the economic base of support for the Mujahideen among

1 primarily the rural population by deliberately disrupting
2 food production and economic life in the countryside in
3 general. In this they have been much more successful than in
4 the purely military efforts, and the economic problem
5 presently looms as the single most serious threat to the
6 resistance in the short to medium term.

7 In the political realm, Soviet efforts have focused on
8 winning over, bribing and coopting various tribal chieftans
9 and Muslim dignitaries and building a loyal cadre with a
10 vested political and economic interest in the regime's
11 survival.

12 The number one objective here is to isolate the
13 resistance politically and gradually transform the conflict
14 into a civil war between forces loyal to the regime and the
15 Mujahideen -- as in Central Asia, by the way, I should add.

16 Overall, despite the fact that Freedom Fighters continue
17 to demonstrate high morale and indomitable courage as well as
18 improved military effectiveness, the Soviet position in
19 Afghanistan in my view has improved considerably in the past
20 three years, the resistance has been forced on the defensive,
21 and its long-term prospects are bleak unless these negative
22 trends are reversed.

23 Before discussing the ways in which these trends could
24 be reversed, and the role that the West could play in that,
25 it is perhaps useful to address the question of the

1 implications of a Soviet victory in Afghanistan, some of
2 which we heard in the explanation of the strategic maps.

3 There is, in my opinion, no clear evidence that Moscow's
4 invasion of Afghanistan was part of a specific blueprint of
5 expansionism in Southwest Asia, as as has been argued it is,
6 and it is much more likely that the overriding objective was
7 to prevent the overthrow of the communist regime by force,
8 which would have set a very bad precedent from Moscow's point
9 of view.

10 Nonetheless, it is clear that the consolidation of
11 Soviet control in Afghanistan will improve the Soviet
12 strategic position in Southwest Asia and open a number of
13 very tempting opportunities for expanding Soviet influence in
14 this key strategic region.

15 Pakistan, which historically has been beset by regional
16 and separatist strife, would be most directly threatened.
17 The Soviet Union already has a considerable record of
18 subversive involvement in Pakistani separatist movements,
19 also in Baluchistan, and some of the Pushtunistan areas. It
20 is not likely to resist the temptation to destabilize a key
21 western alley.

22 With a hostile communist Afghan regime, the Soviet army
23 on its borders, and perhaps up to four million, possibly,
24 "palestinized" Afghan refugees, Pakistan, will find itself in
25 a more serious security predicament if and when the Soviets

strengthen their grip on Afghanistan.

The incorporation of Afghanistan in the Soviet Bloc would also present Moscow with opportunities in Iran, which is certain to experience serious political upheavals in the next few years. It should be recalled, as was already demonstrated, that Balouch territory extends through much of Southeastern Iran all the way to the Strait of Hormuz. And also there are other nationalities, such as the Tudeh in the north and Pushtune refugees, which the Soviets could conceivably use in their effort to destabilize Iran in the future.

Already there is considerable evidence that the Soviets are training and preparing Balouch separatists and Iranian Tudeh members, the communist party of Iran, and Pakistani left-wing oppositionists in Herat and Kabul for future contingencies.

Apart from these political opportunities there are a number of military power projection advantages that accrue to the Soviets in Afghanistan. Some of them were already mentioned. Soviet interdiction capabilities in the Persian Gulf are dramatically enhanced by their ability to operate out of airfields in Afghanistan.

For example, the distance between Southwestern Afghanistan and the Strait of Hormuz is less than 300 miles, which is easily within operating range of most Soviet

1 aircraft.

2 Also, in the Indian Ocean, besides the examples that
3 were given, it should be mentioned that backfire bombers
4 operating out of Afghanistan could reach the key U.S. base at
5 Diego Garcia without refueling, which they were not able to
6 do before. So transport airplanes could reach points in
7 Eastern Africa, such as Ethiopia, again without refueling,
8 which in my opinion considerably increases their strategic
9 advantage.

10 Further, Soviet control of the Wakhan Corridor puts them
11 within easy interdiction range of the Karakorum Highway,
12 which is the only Chinese outlet to the Indian Ocean. A
13 Sovietized Afghanistan, in short, could be and very likely
14 would be transformed from an historical buffer zone to a
15 stepping stone for further Soviet stabilization and expansion
16 in a region that is vital and will remain vital to Western
17 security interests.

18 Although these trends observed in the struggle for
19 Afghanistan in my opinion are not particularly encouraging
20 for the resistance at present, it is by no means a foregone
21 conclusion the Soviets will be victorious. One of the main
22 reasons for the difficulties experienced by the Mujahideen at
23 the present is the fact in my opinion the aid effort mounted
24 by Western countries and others to date does not appear to be
25 very effective. Five years after the Soviet invasion, the

1 resistance has still not been provided with adequate
2 quantities of effective weapons. There has been no
3 systematic effort to provide economic assistance within the
4 country, and the political dimension of the country, which is
5 very important, has been neglected.

6 There are a number of reasons that may explain this
7 failure. Perhaps most important, even though not the most
8 obvious one, is the seeming lack of clear objectives to be
9 achieved, clear Western objectives, and objectives of those
10 that support it, objectives to be achieved through the
11 provision of Western aid.

12 Despite considerable rhetoric decrying Soviet behavior,
13 the prevailing attitude in the West seems to be one of
14 resigned belief in the inevitable defeat of the resistance
15 and unwillingness to test the validity of this proposition by
16 providing the Mujahideen with the means to dramatically raise
17 the cost of the war to the Soviets.

18 Such unwillingness is usually justified by arguments
19 that a more effective aid program may trigger an escalation
20 of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan or endanger
21 Pakistan.

22 Both of these concerns, in my opinion, are based on
23 flawed premises. There is no reason to believe, for example,
24 that the Soviets are willing or even able to escalate the
25 involvement in Afghanistan to the point where they can expect

1 a quick military solution. Given the terrain of the country
2 and the dedication and commitment of the resistance, even
3 half a million Soviet soldiers cannot guarantee Moscow the
4 desired military and political outcome in the short term. If
5 it did, they would not have hesitated deploying such numbers
6 as they did, for example, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, where
7 they did deploy half a million men.

8 On the other hand, for the Afghan people, of whom close
9 to a million have been killed and more than four million, as
10 has been mentioned, forced to flee the country, escalation is
11 not really a meaningful concept. Short of open genocide, it
12 cannot get much worse. As far as Pakistan is concerned, as
13 long as the Afghan struggle continues, the Soviet Union is
14 not in a position to mount a real military threat to it.
15 Thus, in a very real sense the Afghan resistance does act as
16 Pakistan's forward defense. And a good case could be made if
17 it becomes stronger, it can only enhance Islamabad's
18 security.

19 Therefore, there are some very good reasons for a
20 concerted Western effort, which must be led by the United
21 States, to provide the Afghans with the means needed not only
22 to fight and die but to give them a chance to advance their
23 cause. The resistance has a tremendous unrealized potential
24 and the motivation necessary to mount a real challenge to the
25 Soviets. We do not know if the Soviets will ever be willing

1 to reach an accommodation and leave the country, but the
2 point I would like to raise here is we will never find out
3 whether that is the case unless we make it possible for the
4 Mujahideen to make Moscow pay a very steep price for its
5 aggression.

6 Above and beyond the moral imperative of helping a small
7 people subject to aggression by a great power, there is a
8 very strategic imperative to do so. For the Afghan struggle,
9 without question, is also the West's struggle.

10 To begin with, a good case could be made that by tying
11 down the Soviets in a military conflict, however limited, the
12 Afghans have placed some restraints on Soviet behavior
13 elsewhere. The relative Soviet retrenchment in the Third
14 World, of which Ambassador Kirkpatrick spoke, that has become
15 noticeable in the past four or five years is at least in part
16 due to Afghanistan since Moscow has been historically
17 reluctant to become engaged in several conflicts at the same
18 time.

19 Western ability to assist the Mujahideen in putting up a
20 stiffer and more effective resistance, even if ultimately
21 unsuccessful, would have served a purpose of demonstrating a
22 determination to stand up to Soviet expansionism and is very
23 likely to be taken into serious consideration in future
24 Soviet decisions on intervention in other places.

25 Conversely, failure to do so could only encourage Soviet

1 perceptions that the West is reluctant and incapable of
2 resisting even the most blatant encroachments. Western
3 unwillingness to provide the Afghans with modern anti-air
4 weapons under the pretext of plausible deniability, for
5 example, is in all probability interpreted by Soviet generals
6 not as a sensible policy of avoiding confrontation but as a
7 sign of weakness.

8 It should be noted here that efficient Western aid could
9 also be extremely cost effective. The principles of
10 guerrilla war dictate that every dollar of effective aid to
11 the guerrilla could cost up to 10 times as much to the
12 opposing side to counteract. That is \$10 the Soviets may
13 otherwise be spending on weapons threatening us directly.

14 Finally, a successful resistance and Soviet failure to
15 pacify Afghanistan by military means may force in the long
16 term the Soviet leadership to start questioning the
17 traditional Soviet belief in the unlimited political utility
18 of military power -- a belief which is both a cornerstone of
19 their political value system and a key determinant of Soviet
20 international behavior.

21 Should the Soviets be made to realize that they cannot
22 achieve the Sovietization of Afghanistan except at a
23 prohibitive cost, it is not at all inconceivable that they
24 may settle for much less than outright domination of
25 Afghanistan. When asked why the Soviet Union failed to

1 Sovietize Finland after the winter war of 1939-1940, Stalin
2 reportedly replied, "A hedgehog could be swallowed, but it is
3 an extremely uncomfortable process."

4 It is not only our moral obligation but also in the best
5 interests of the United States and the West to do everything
6 possible to make Moscow's attempt to swallow Afghanistan also
7 as uncomfortable as possible.

8 Thank you.

9 Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Mr. Alexiev.

10 There are some in the Administration who like to feel
11 that things are going well in Afghanistan and that our
12 policies have been effective and cite the statistic that the
13 Freedom Fighters control only about 10 or 20 percent of the
14 countryside and that the Soviets by implication control the
15 rest.

16 Let me ask each of you do the Soviets control 80 percent
17 of the countryside; and, if so, is that important? Let me
18 ask you to keep your answers brief, if you can.

19 Dr. Gouttierre. I think that the most important factor
20 to this is who is being put on the defensive. I think Yossef
21 indicated that in his own presentation.

22 I think the most important thing here in terms of the
23 resource, in terms of being able to control what some say is
24 80 percent of the country, is that they have essentially the
25 run of the country in being able to carry on their activities

1 that are particularly focused in the rural areas.

2 But in the end result, the most important element to
3 this whole righting will be the ability of the resistance to
4 put the Soviets more on defensive in the areas which the
5 Soviets have concentrated on controlling.

6 I agree with both Yossef and Alex that they need to have
7 the appropriate technology to do that. We talk about
8 appropriate technology in development schemes around the
9 world. There is also an appropriate technology for supplying
10 I think resistance forces.

11 The Afghans need appropriate technology in order to be
12 able to put the Soviets on the defensive. The percentages I
13 think are not all that important, although in some ways we
14 have to recognize there is an advantage to the resistance to
15 be able to have the run of the country in terms of their
16 rural strategy.

17 Senator Humphrey. Mr. Bodansky, is it part of Soviet
18 strategy to try to control the entire countryside?

19 Mr. Bodansky. No.

20 Senator Humphrey. Let me follow up on that. Then I
21 will give you free run. The answer is no, it is not part of
22 their strategy.

23 Mr. Bodansky. In the time frame we are talking about.

24 Senator Humphrey. So the assumption that the Soviets
25 have been able to occupy, maybe that is a better word, only

1 20 percent is a sign they are bogged down is false, in your
2 opinion.

3 Mr. Bodansky. Certainly false.

4 Senator Humphrey. Certainly false in my opinion. I
5 shouldn't try to put words in your mouth, but too many in
6 this country are assuming because the Soviets haven't
7 occupied 100 percent of the entire country, they haven't
8 tried to occupy 100 percent of the country.

9 Mr. Bodansky. They will not try.

10 Senator Humphrey. So they haven't failed in that sense.

11 Mr. Bodansky. No. I think they have succeeded
12 exceptionally well.

13 Senator Humphrey. If their strategy then is not to
14 occupy 100 percent of the country but instead strategic
15 facilities and locations, then what is their strategy?

16 Mr. Bodansky. To my mind, the strategy is to establish,
17 to control bases from which they can advance further should
18 the need arise. The Soviet military operates in accordance
19 with specific requirements of the government. So the
20 government tells them consolidate the capabilities to do so
21 if and when the party decides they should advance rather than
22 to prevent a resistance from challenging or endangering their
23 ability to operate these bases. These are the two
24 requirements from the Soviet Union.

25 Let's look at historic precedence. If we look at the

1 Bashmajir Rebellion, Soviets are distinguished in 1922 when
2 they succeeded to suppress leadership of the Bashmajir with
3 the continuation of large-scale fighting to 1923. The
4 Soviets say by 1922, although fighting continued, they had
5 the country. The officers of that area started at that
6 period to concentrate on the subversion of the entire region,
7 looking at Central Asia, their own Central Asia, as an
8 internal problem that will be solved eventually. I think the
9 approach the Soviets take to Afghanistan is identical.

10 Senator Humphrey. Dr. Alexiev, your thoughts on that.
11 If the Soviet strategy is not to occupy the entire country,
12 what is the strategy?

13 Mr. Alexiev. That is certainly not their strategy. Let
14 me add here a lot of Afghanistan is not occupiable because it
15 is desert or otherwise uninhabited.

16 Another good example that the Soviets are not indeed
17 trying to occupy the country physically is the fact they have
18 left large parts of the country essentially alone. The
19 central area of Afghanistan has been left alone because the
20 Soviets believe that once they take care of other strategic
21 areas, they will have no problem subduing these areas that
22 they do not now pay attention to.

23 So their strategy essentially is to win the war
24 economically and politically, and as long as they control the
25 vital centers of the country, they control the major

1 logistics routes and transportation routes, that the military
2 pacification of the country after economic and political
3 success has been achieved will now be very difficult.

4 Again, to give not only the Bachow Rebellion as an
5 example, but to give the examples of the rebellions in
6 Lithuania after the war and also the anti-Soviet war in the
7 northern Caucasian area. The same thing essentially
8 happened, where the Soviets did not try to occupy all the
9 resistance areas but concentrated instead on breaking up
10 resistance politically and economically.

11 In fact, if you look at the example of Lithuania, when
12 the anti-Soviet guerrillas finally laid down arms, they still
13 controlled perhaps half of the country. They had anywhere
14 between 15,000 and 20,000 men under arms. But they were
15 defeated economically. They didn't have anything to eat.
16 They didn't have any ammunition. So they surrendered.

17 Senator Humphrey. So the Soviet strategy is not to go
18 for a knockout punch in the military sense.

19 Mr. Alexiev. No.

20 Senator Humphrey. But to control the important
21 resources and to destroy, through political and economic
22 means, the ability of the resistance to continue. Is that
23 correct?

24 Mr. Alexiev. That is my view of it.

25 Senator Humphrey. Those terms, economic and political

1 warfare, hardly seem adequate to what is going on. Can you
2 translate those terms, economic and political warfare, into
3 the reality that is occurring as an integral part of the
4 Soviet strategy, talking about the starvation, the terror,
5 and so on?

6 Mr. Alexiev. To the Soviets, historically, economic
7 warfare has included famine as a weapon, or starvation, if
8 you will. And political warfare has included also
9 assassinations and terror. But to them that is very
10 political. So we shouldn't discuss them in the Western
11 connotation of these words but, rather, in the way the
12 Soviets perceive them.

13 I am sure that in the previous hearings the economic
14 dimension of the Soviet efforts became very clear. What it
15 is is essentially an effort to starve the Mujahideen out,
16 destroying the economic base of their support. I don't need
17 to go into details.

18 Let me just say that even Afghan official sources now
19 admit that the crop has gone down to somewhere around 25
20 percent of where it was in '78. Already in some parts of the
21 country it is very serious, at least the threat of a famine.

22 About a month ago, in Paris, the French experts on
23 Afghanistan, who perhaps are the most knowledgeable in the
24 West, had a meeting along with all the various doctors
25 organizations, physicians organizations, that help inside of

1 Afghanistan, and their collective belief is at least half a
2 million people in Afghanistan are threatened with famine
3 immediately now. As the winter goes on, it will probably get
4 much worse.

5 Another indication of the dimension of the problem is
6 that even though the routes that lead to Pakistan which the
7 refugees use are covered with deep snows at this time of the
8 year, anywhere from two to four meters of snow, according to
9 the Pakistani Commission on Refugees, at least 10,000
10 refugees every month are coming over, even during the winter,
11 which is an indication of the very serious problem.

12 Senator Humphrey. I want to pursue that further with
13 you, but I think I should give Congressman Ritter a fair
14 opportunity to do the same.

15 Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 I was interested in the testimony, Dr. Bodansky, and I
17 will quote what you said: The Soviets are running and
18 manipulating complete resistance organizations. Could you
19 please expand on that?

20 Mr. Bodansky. Sure. Of the variety of examples, I
21 think the most important are the Soviet activities with the
22 Shiite population. There are about a dozen organizations of
23 various sizes that are being financed and that are being
24 equipped either by the Iranian government with Soviet
25 equipment or directly by the Soviets.

1 Mr. Ritter. Are you saying the Iranian government is
2 cooperating with pro-Soviet resistance groups?

3 Mr. Bodansky. To the best of my knowledge, yes, sir. I
4 can give you an example. One of the resistance leaders near
5 Herat was invited by the Iranian government to receive new
6 equipment. He took with him a major of the logistics
7 services of the Afghan armed forces that defected recently.
8 According to the testimony of that major, the equipment that
9 was offered to them, machine guns, any other weapons systems,
10 was brand new and was packed and labeled exactly the same way
11 that the equipment that his previous unit in the DRA used to
12 receive from the Soviet Union. He said there is no
13 difference. The weapons arrived from the Soviet Union, with
14 the full knowledge of the government.

15 There are many other examples of that kind. But just
16 sort of to cut it short, the most successful instrument the
17 Soviets have today in dealing with resistance forces, in
18 cutting the lines of communication, in ambushing commanders
19 and assassinating commanders, is deep penetration and
20 bringing the commander to the wrong place, or any other force
21 to be killed or destroyed, bringing them into a killing zone.

22 Mr. Ritter. Are you saying not direct confrontation but
23 the intelligence function, the KGB functions and
24 disinformation is more debilitating to the Afghan Freedom
25 Fighters today than the direct confrontation with the Soviet

1 forces?

2 Mr. Bodansky. It ends up with direct confrontation.
3 You have special forces coming in and killing or you have a
4 helicopter coming down and bombing.

5 Mr. Ritter. Why is this information that you are
6 presenting to us simply not reported in our everyday media,
7 these kinds of infiltrations of a dozen or so groups, the
8 cooperation with the Iranian government, the Shiite, certain
9 segments of the Shiite population supporting active
10 resistance groups?

11 Mr. Bodansky. Personally I don't have any control on
12 the western media. But the material is available. The
13 material is pouring out in unbelievable quantity. That
14 campaign of penetration, manipulation, sort of
15 self-destruction of the resistance, is pouring out in growing
16 quantities and in alarming frequency.

17 The successes of the Soviets in assassinating key
18 commanders over the last few months is frightening, the
19 Soviets not only assassinating commanders because they have
20 data on them, but it is a country-wide or province-wide
21 predetermined campaign. They know when to kill them. They
22 kill them in the right moment, not just because they are
23 available; the ability of resistance to coordinate forces by
24 assassinating all the midlevel commanders in one province,
25 then go for a sweep and collect the pieces. They do it all

1 the time. It has intensified as of '83 and '84, the moment
2 they decided okay, we are going to play in the Muslim way, as
3 they call it, concentrate and get the resistance to work for
4 us, exactly like the Russian army killed the lieutenant of
5 Shamel and brought about the collapse of the Caucasian
6 Rebellion and the uprising in the 1750s. The same with the
7 Apmabarchan in the 1820s. It has happened before.

8 Mr. Ritter. Could I ask a question then? If this
9 penetration and manipulation is becoming so intensified and
10 so successful, then even if the free world or the world
11 supporting the Afghan Freedom Fighters increased its level of
12 military support and technology, appropriate technology, we
13 would conceivably be donating to the wrong people and the
14 internal mechanisms might be so weakened that the materials
15 could be used against the Freedom Fighters cause. Is that
16 possible?

17 Mr. Bodansky. That is possible if Western aid arrives
18 very late. But if we look at the current situation of
19 Afghanistan, assuming the change might come in the near
20 future, we have to look at the key to our understanding the
21 future of this process, of this trend, is their profiles of
22 the individuals as the finger pointers. These are dedicated
23 resistance fighters who are totally disillusioned, totally
24 disappointed, that lost any hope and faith in the cause of
25 the resistance and are trying to buy a better future for the

1 families through act of changing their own personal code.

2 This is a personal collapse of the individual. If the
3 current commanders see that there is hope they are winning,
4 they are beginning to win, that aid is pouring in, and that
5 they are not isolated and cut off from the rest of the world --

6 Mr. Ritter. How much time do we have?

7 Mr. Bodansky. Months, to my mind.

8 Mr. Ritter. Months?

9 Mr. Bodansky. Months.

10 Mr. Ritter. Mr. Alexiev?

11 Mr. Alexiev. I am much more optimistic than Yossef is.
12 I don't think it is a question of months. I think fighting
13 will be going on in Afghanistan for years to come.

14 Mr. Ritter. But I mean before we get to the point of no
15 return and with the extrapolation no matter what gets thrown
16 in, it still comes out in a downward direction, maybe not as
17 steep, what is your time?

18 Mr. Alexiev. I can't put a number of months or years on
19 it, but I believe that it is a lot. It is going to be much
20 longer than months. I think it will take probably years.

21 Mr. Ritter. Dr. Gouttierre, you are familiar with the
22 social and traditional institutions of the country. How long
23 will it take?

24 Dr. Gouttierre. I am more sanguine than is Yossef as
25 well, I think primarily because of those positive factors

1 that I was enunciating during my presentation.

2 I think that the kind of thing which Yossef has
3 described is something which is not, as he would indicate,
4 brand new, and these kinds of attempt have been going on
5 throughout the five years. The fact that there has been an
6 increasing number of commanders killed in battle as well as
7 through assassination over the last five months is alarming
8 to me, but I don't think that this is an indication that
9 there is a wholesale loss in this area.

10 One of the things I think we need to remember, too, is
11 the Afghan intelligence itself, resistance intelligence
12 itself, has not been ineffective throughout the last five
13 years. It has increased in certain, I think, capabilities.

14 The Soviets have reacted to this and have sought to
15 preclude the Afghan puppet regime from any real role that
16 might provide information to the resistance. But at the same
17 time, the Afghans are reacting to this and finding new ways.

18 It is amazing the kind of specific information that
19 comes out relating to what is going on inside Afghanistan of
20 a very personal nature to individuals and their Afghan regime
21 and also Soviets as well as certain elements of Soviet
22 strategy.

23 So in concluding, I would say I am more sanguine that
24 Yossef is. I am not going to say we have months or even a
25 year or two. Again, let me go back to the phrase I used

1 earlier, that if we use appropriate technology, and we are
2 talking about military, we are talking about humanitarian
3 assistance in the areas of food, education and medicine, that
4 the Afghans -- I used to coach basketball in Afghanistan for
5 a long time. I coached the national basketball team. It
6 gave me sort of an insight into the Afghan desire as Alex was
7 suggesting.

8 They like to play with a winner. They have a real
9 capacity for perceiving the way the trend may be going,
10 whether it be in sports or whatever the case may be. They
11 are very clever in their perceptions this way.

12 Mr. Ritter. What is your thought about the time that we
13 have? I mean several years ago involving these questions it
14 seemed we were really talking many years. But recently the
15 intensity of the situation has increased and it seems we have
16 gone much more negatively for the Freedom Fighters.

17 Dr. Gouttierre. I think in some aspects that is true.
18 But we also have to remember that five years for a resistance
19 movement under many circumstances would indicate that is a
20 young resistance movement.

21 Mr. Ritter. But Dr. Alexiev has said that the isolation
22 of I guess it was Caucasian or Central Asian group --

23 Dr. Gouttierre. But the Afghans haven't been isolated
24 in the same fashion yet. In other words, the situation in
25 Central Asia and the Caucasian areas was not exactly the same

1 as to the way the resistance was able to receive external
2 aid.

3 I think the question on that is the appropriateness of
4 it and efficiency. I think that today there is a better
5 military situation than there was even a year ago at this
6 time in terms of the way the Afghans are being trained and
7 getting assistance. I am not painting a rosy picture in
8 saying that. I am just saying that I think the response that
9 perhaps public hearings like this and just the examination of
10 things, the sophistication of the Afghans and their ability
11 to handle these pieces of equipment and development of
12 strategy, it takes time to develop these things. I think
13 that these are developing them.

14 I think the point that is important is the Afghans are
15 not in a position right now of what I would call a decline.
16 I think we are at a very, very fragile and crucial period and
17 that the effectiveness of our involvement is going to be even
18 more crucial. But I think that at least to me it has been
19 demonstrated that there is knowledge about what is necessary
20 to be done and that the training and the equipment
21 considerations are improving. But I am not saying that they
22 are at the point where they need to be.

23 Mr. Ritter. Dr. Bodansky, are you in agreement with
24 that?

25 Mr. Bodansky. No, sir, because it seems me that the

1 major problem --

2 Mr. Ritter. What did you say?

3 Mr. Bodansky. I said no, sir. The major problem the
4 resistance is facing today, it is not just the mere
5 assassinations but assassinations of commanders in combat,
6 and as has been said before, it has happened before. But the
7 resistance was always able to replenish and infiltrate new
8 commanders to take over in their continuity of a party or a
9 commander to run a bunch of people in that location, despite
10 harassment, despite the sacrifices and victims. They cannot
11 do it today.

12 Just to give you two examples that came to my mind.
13 Sabula, one of the best commanders in the area, has been
14 assassinated. This happens no other way but by betrayal.

15 Mr. Ritter. Is this Soviet special forces?

16 Mr. Bodansky. Yes. A mine and side charge had been
17 organized in such a way when he entered into a secret path,
18 that he decided upon only the night before because he
19 recorded it, it exploded and he was killed. The same method
20 was used for another commander in Muristat who was killed on
21 January 28th of this year with an entire village destroyed on
22 the same day so as not to leave any marks. After he left his
23 800 resistance force. Again, this was something that was
24 decided minutes before. And the Soviets jumped and killed
25 him. In both cases the resistance was unable to infiltrate

1 new commanders to take over.

2 We see a crumbling of the resistance forces that was
3 otherwise functioning. In Mosra Sharif, there are no leaders
4 or nobody to tell them what to do. That is what frightens
5 me. The Soviets can exploit success and bring about the
6 erosion. That is something that happened.

7 This is something that is mounting in the sophistication
8 of this effort and, if continued, will to my mind bring about
9 the collapse of the resistance either before the '85-'86
10 winter or after the '85-'86 winter because they cannot
11 withstand it.

12 Mr. Ritter Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

13 Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

14 I want to explore further the Soviet strategy. If the
15 Soviets have not gone for the knockout punch, and obviously
16 they haven't, instead opting for a long-range strategy,
17 holding key centers, and practicing genocide against the
18 people as a means of destroying resistance, if the Soviets
19 have not gone for the knockout punch, the question is why
20 have they not? Why haven't they tried to occupy a hundred
21 percent of the country? Why haven't they tried to destroy in
22 a short period of time the entire Afghan resistance?

23 Dr. Alexiev, is there a reason they haven't done that?
24 If they could get a quick victory, they would go for one,
25 surely.

1 Mr. Alexiev. That is right. But they cannot.

2 Senator Humphrey. Why have they not?

3 Mr. Alexiev. In my opinion, in order to control the
4 country, to control Afghanistan, they would have to inject
5 the kind of resources that perhaps they are not capable of.
6 I mean we very often assume that the Soviets have unlimited
7 resources, both military and economic. That is simply not
8 the case. I don't believe the Soviet Union can put in half a
9 million men.

10 Senator Humphrey. They presently have about 115,000 or
11 120,000.

12 Mr. Alexiev. That is roughly the estimate, although
13 there are some people who argue it is actually a lot less
14 than that.

15 Senator Humphre. In any case, are you suggesting it
16 would take an increase of manpower on the order of a factor
17 of five?

18 Mr. Alexiev. I am not sure that would do it either.

19 Senator Humphrey. Even that would not assure that.

20 Mr. Alexiev. That is right. The nature of the terrain
21 in Afghanistan is such that actually physical occupation of
22 the country is almost unthinkable. This a country the size
23 of Texas that is essentially vertical. It is not a feasible
24 proposition. Even if it were, for the Soviets, the economic
25 consideration, the cost involved to do such a thing, apart

1 from the political cost, the military cost, I imagine, for
2 example, that a force of that nature would require maybe five
3 to six times, maybe up to ten times the helicopter force they
4 have there now. That would mean to weakening Soviet
5 positions in other places of the world.

6 It is very clear, I don't think they can afford it. So
7 people that argue that we should not try to raise up the ante
8 because anything we can do, the Soviets can do us one better,
9 I think really are not correct in that assessment. I think
10 the Soviet capabilities of projecting power are finite. If
11 they could, if they thought they could achieve their
12 objectives in a quick way, I am sure they would do it. But
13 there is no certainty on their part that even, as I said,
14 half a million men would achieve the purpose. And being
15 bogged down with half a million men is something they would
16 not want to have.

17 On the other hand, as I have indicated and I believe the
18 present strategy is working for them, it is a long-term
19 strategy. They are not going to solve the problem tomorrow,
20 the day after tomorrow. But they don't need to.

21 By that I mean the Soviets are not thinking in terms of
22 defeating the resistance tomorrow. What they are thinking of
23 is making the Afghan resistance a nuisance rather than a
24 serious problem. Even if they achieve their major
25 objectives, I am convinced that fighting will continue to go

1 on in Afghanistan for years to come.

2 But as I think Yossef mentioned, in Central Asia, the
3 Bashiv movement was essentially crushed by 1926 militarily;
4 yet fighting continued until at least the mid-thirties. And
5 the same thing, I am afraid, is what the Soviets are
6 attempting to do in Afghanistan.

7 Senator Humphrey. Dr. Gouttierre, do you agree the
8 Soviets have not gone for the knockout punch, the quick
9 victory, because it would take a much larger commitment of
10 troops?

11 Dr. Gouttierre. I think that is obvious.

12 Senator Humphrey. It isn't obvious to everybody,
13 believe me.

14 Dr. Gouttierre. It is going to take obviously more
15 troops than have been employed so far.

16 Senator Humphrey. By what factor would they have to
17 increase that commitment?

18 Dr. Gouttierre. I am not a specialist in that area. We
19 keep hearing that it would be by a factor of five or around
20 half a million troops. That is the magic number you keep
21 hearing. I don't know how many it would require.

22 But I think we also have to understand that one of the
23 reasons why they haven't gone in for the knockout punch is
24 they haven't been able to deliver the knockout punch to date.
25 I think that is a very important consideration.

1 I share Yossef's concern and also Alex's of the Soviet
2 ability to maybe deliver this knockout punch sometime in the
3 near future, if particular negative factors having an impact
4 on the Afghans' ability to resist the control of the Soviets
5 persist. But I think that also there is to me a solid
6 foundation with which the Afghans are able to deal, that
7 should they get again the appropriate technology across the
8 broad spectrum, that this particular kind of scenario -- I
9 think both of these gentlemen have indicated that as well --
10 is one that might be avoided.

11 I tend to feel that the situation right now is a little
12 more sanguine on the side of the Afghans because of the
13 factors that I feel don't necessarily pertain to the Afghans,
14 that may have pertained to other areas, and that are maybe
15 caused by my long-term association with the Afghans. I have
16 a lot of regard for their tenacity and the strengths of their
17 institutions.

18 But I can't tell you exactly how many troops are
19 required. I don't think the Soviets have been up to this
20 point able to deliver that knockout punch. I think the
21 Afghans have surprised many people around the world with
22 their ability to sustain this resistance.

23 Senator Humphrey. Supposing they did try to increase
24 their troop commitments to say half a million, Mr. Bodansky.
25 How would they do it? They don't have those kinds of forces

1 readily available, do they? Where would they get them?

2 Mr. Bodansky. No, they don't have the troops readily
3 available, and I don't see them being able to sustain them in
4 Afghanistan. There is not enough military structure in
5 Afghanistan that they can house that many troops. There is
6 no point.

7 If we look at the Soviet deployment in Afghanistan, if I
8 can go into a little bit more detail, the Soviets to my mind
9 entered in 1979 with an idea of somehow supporting the local
10 armed forces and getting the hell out of there as fast as it
11 could. The major decisionmaking on Afghanistan was the
12 spring of 1980 when they realized they were going to stay
13 there and, therefore, decided that the bulk of their
14 deployment in that country was going to be part projection
15 oriented.

16 By the fall, early winter of 1980, the bulk of the
17 Soviet forces in Afghanistan, at that time about 16 percent
18 of the Soviet forces in the country, were housed in garrisons
19 outside the reach of the resistance. Since then, if we look
20 at the Soviet reinforcement, there is a very interesting
21 correlation. When the country subsides and comes down, then
22 the Soviet reinforces that region. They do not reinforce
23 before they go for the kill. They reinforce after they go
24 for the kill. Most of the reinforcements go directly into
25 bases surrounded by very wide belts of mines and other

1 obstacles, usually three to four kilometers wide. The troops
2 are sitting there, not exposed to danger, and contributing
3 nothing to the pacification.

4 There is limited ability of the Soviets to install
5 troops in this basin. They are building a lot, but more air
6 bases and forward deployment zones, forward basing zones,
7 rather than garrisons where they can house troops.

8 Senator Humphrey. I think the key phrase there is
9 limited ability. I agree with that. What I am trying to do
10 in this line of questioning is to dissolve the image of the
11 Soviets as having achieved a fait accompli. We imagine the
12 Soviets have all the advantages and none of the
13 vulnerabilities. That isn't so. It would take an enormously
14 larger amount of troops to prevail militarily. That larger
15 commitment would require them to withdraw troops from the
16 border with China, from Eastern Europe, perhaps to resort to
17 even greater conscription, which has its own domestic
18 penalties. It would cost them enormously in economic terms
19 to maintain and support. It would up the ante tremendously.

20 Why should they do it when they can do it on the cheap,
21 as they are today, by holding a few key points and destroying
22 the Afghan people?

23 Mr. Bodansky. If I may interrupt, I think that the
24 major threat, potential threat, we have today with
25 Afghanistan is not how many troops are going to be brought

1 into Afghanistan but the export of Muslim self-identity. The
2 realization that their fate there in Central Asia is not
3 doomed, that something might happen, is the greatest
4 potential for solution of the Afghan problem, because on the
5 one hand the Soviets will be denied the use of the Muslim
6 population as a source of manpower, especially to the
7 military and industry, and on the other hand that is a
8 different league of problem and they will have to pour in
9 millions of troops to control the area.

10 This is something that they cannot do objectively unless
11 there is total mobilization, at whatever price this may have
12 to the national economy. That is the potential for an
13 escalation in Afghanistan.

14 Senator Humphrey. There are those who say that if the
15 free world were to enable the Freedom Fighters to fight
16 effectively against Soviet helicopters, for instance, that
17 the provision of such aid would stimulate the Soviets to
18 respond massively. We have been talking about the ability of
19 the Soviets to respond massively.

20 How could they do it? How could they respond? If the
21 assumption is correct that providing more effective weaponry
22 to the Freedom Fighters would invite massive escalation by
23 the Soviets, how could they possibly do it? Could things be
24 any worse than they are today for the Freedom Fighters?

25 Mr. Bodansky. Yes. Because the greatest vulnerability

1 of the resistance is lack of organization, command structure,
2 and normal functioning lines of communication. If we just
3 throw a few missiles, regardless of the type, to a local
4 commander, as dedicated as he may be, Soviet repression will
5 be localized.

6 They have ample facets in Afghanistan to do it today.
7 They won't like the escalation, but it won't be a disastrous
8 setback. What is going to happen is there will be a collapse
9 of the resistance infrastructure in that area.

10 If we look, for example, at an attempted kidnap of a
11 lieutenant colonel in Banishavan, the commanders were wiped
12 out, and so were those kidnaped. But about four to six
13 thousand civilians were destroyed and the entire lines of
14 communication were destroyed. That is something they could
15 not recover from. So if we supply them the efficient
16 weapons, teach them what to do, not only technically how to
17 pull the trigger, but also the support system that can
18 withstand the action and come back and maintain the pressure
19 on the Soviets, then the Soviets do not have the reaction in
20 Afghanistan today with forces capable of answering to this
21 issue.

22 Senator Humphrey. Mr. Alexiev, what of this contention
23 that if the free world were to provide the Freedom Fighters
24 with more effective weapons, that it would stimulate massive
25 Soviet escalation? What do you think of that contention?

1 Mr. Alexiev. I don't think very much of it. As I think
2 I indicated in my testimony, we already discussed why they
3 may not be able to escalate in terms of putting in more
4 troops to the point where they may think that they could win.
5 I also doubt very much whether they are actually capable of
6 projecting technical military power of the kind that will
7 subdue the resistance.

8 Perhaps I disagree somewhat with Yossef on the point of
9 destroying Mujahideen organizational capabilities in the
10 country. The fact is that five years after the war, they
11 have not really been able to do that in any considerable
12 extent anywhere, even in Panjhir, where they have now had
13 eight offensives one after the other. Using the last time
14 around, 500 tanks and God knows how many helicopters, and
15 depopulating the area. They have not been able to destroy
16 the resistance. Even the assassination attempts are not
17 nearly as frightening as I think they may appear. Sabul is
18 the first commander of rank and name that has been killed of
19 the top ten commanders in Afghanistan, five years after the
20 war. More, of course, have been hunted down by the Soviets.
21 But it hasn't been terribly effective.

22 To answer your question, I just don't believe the
23 Soviets have an infinite capacity for increasing. I think
24 this is often an opinion in the West. It is a defeatist
25 attitude because the implicit statement here is that "Look,

1 if they want to do whatever we can do, they can do it better,
2 let's not even try doing it."

3 As applied to Afghanistan, it is a very pernicious
4 attitude.

5 Senator Humphrey. Let's try to conclude by making some
6 specific recommendations on what the free world should do to
7 help the Freedom Fighters deals effectively with the strategy
8 that is now becoming clear; namely, to eliminate the ability
9 of the Freedom Fighters to continue by destroying the
10 economy, destroying agriculture, destroying society, while
11 continuing to hold onto key strategic points.

12 Dr. Gouttierre, do you have some specific proposals?

13 Dr. Gouttierre. Well, they are the same basic proposals
14 that I had five years ago in a similar situation. That is
15 that the most important elements are to ensure again that the
16 Afghans have the appropriate technology. I think we must
17 understand what this term means.

18 Senator Humphrey. What does that mean?

19 Dr. Gouttierre. I am glad you asked. It means not only
20 the specific kind of weapons but also the right training and
21 also providing them to the right people.

22 If one engages willy-nilly in the distribution of these
23 things, you create a situation that will, of course, invite
24 the kind of retaliation that will ensure the destruction of
25 various forces around Afghanistan. I think that there has

1 been an increased development in terms of providing
2 appropriate technology. I am not saying that it is there. I
3 am just saying there has been development along those lines.

4 In addition to that, I think it is important that the
5 public diplomacy --

6 Senator Humphrey. Wait a minute. Before you go on, you
7 said more effective military supplies. What do you mean by
8 that?

9 Dr. Gouttierre. I don't want to go into the specific
10 military weapons. We can talk about armored piercing
11 weaponry. We can talk about missiles and things of this
12 nature. I am talking about in each situation in Afghanistan
13 there is a commander or group of commando units around an
14 area that might require a certain kind of weaponry. I think
15 it is important that that kind of weaponry be directed to
16 them.

17 I think we have to understand what it is they need. It
18 is not all the same. There are some elements that are more
19 effective in urban situations, others that are operating more
20 against bases from a long-term advantage. They need certain
21 kinds of things that would maybe put explosives into a
22 particular area. It is not exactly the same kind of thing
23 that an urban-based approach would require.

24 I am not a specialist on weaponry, but I think that when
25 we are talking of those things, weapons, food, education and

1 medicine, that each particular area has local and regional
2 needs. I think that this has been developing. It is not
3 where it needs to be yet.

4 I think that continued interest on the part of
5 individuals like yourself and Congressman Ritter will of
6 course prompt this kind of more efficient delivery and
7 training that goes along with the weapons themselves.

8 Now, if I may go to the public diplomacy, I think it is
9 only within the last year really that the diplomatic aspect
10 of this thing has received the kind of across-the-board
11 interest that is essential. I am talking about bipartisan
12 not only as it relates to party. I am also talking about
13 bipartisan as it relates to the Administration and Congress.

14 I think the kind of interest that has been obtained over
15 the last half year has greatly increased over the previous
16 four and a half years. This is very important. I think we
17 need to direct this more to the public forums. We need to
18 direct this more to countries like India and to Western
19 Europe, particularly also to the Islamic movement and other
20 Third World countries.

21 I think this particular thing has been carried at a
22 rather low key. The only way I think that there can be a
23 resolution of the war in Afghanistan that would permit the
24 Afghans to achieve their very basic objectives is to have
25 increased military pressure, increased public diplomacy.

1 That entails a whole wide spectrum.

2 The media I have sort of given up on. I think that in
3 terms of sending their own personnel into Afghanistan, they
4 rely very heavily on stringers and very heavily on hearings
5 and press conferences to develop their information. I wish
6 the media would be more persistent and I think more honest,
7 really, in their coverage of the war in Afghanistan. I think
8 we find coverage of wars in Central America is easier to go
9 to.

10 I heard one fellow from the UP told me the trouble with
11 the Afghans is they don't call press conferences, the
12 resistance; therefore, we can't really get much information
13 from them. Well, where is the spirit of investigative
14 journalism that is supposed to prevail in our media?

15 I think those two areas, improved and increased military
16 pressure and improved and increased public diplomacy, are
17 absolutely essential. The Soviets aren't paying in either area
18 the degree to which they need to. But I think, in
19 conclusion, that if the Afghans -- and I think it has to be
20 stressed again -- have the resources to make eventually
21 successful the adaptation of these particular kinds of
22 military and diplomatic pressures that way, they will
23 ultimately achieve their objectives. I believe that because
24 I know the commitment of the Afghan people. It is a war of
25 national liberation now.

1 Senator Humphrey. Before you answer the question,
2 Mr. Bodansky, will you introduce our final witness who is
3 standing over here to your left and tell us about this
4 fellow?

5 Mr. Bodansky. Okay. This is an example of the chemical
6 decontamination suit. It is a brand new suit. The model is
7 old, but the suit itself is brand new. It was captured in
8 the northeastern part of Afghanistan, part of about a dozen
9 that were sent in a truck that were sent with emergency
10 supplies from regiments to a company.

11 Senator Humphrey. When was this captured?

12 Mr. Bodansky. '83.

13 Now, by Soviet definition, you do not send regiment
14 level equipment such as a suit from the regimental storage
15 area to the company or platoon level unless intending use.
16 So the mere fact this dozen suits were on the way, and God
17 knows if more were not there in the same truck, is an
18 indication that somebody higher up decided it is about time
19 the troops will need these suits.

20 Senator Humphrey. Do you suppose the Soviet commanders
21 were anticipating a chemical attack from the Freedom
22 Fighters?

23 Mr. Bodansky. No. Here we go to another step. There
24 are two ways or two forms of wearing this kind of suit. One
25 of them is under attack, when suddenly there is

1 contamination, radiation or chemical, and you start from the
2 mask hood and you go downwards. The other one is when you
3 are in a safe area preparing for possibly going to a
4 contaminated scene. Then you start from the boots and go
5 upwards.

6 One of the questions I asked one of the troops here was
7 how they were trained to use chemical suits. They are
8 trained like all Soviet soldiers. All of them have been
9 trained only on the secondary form of wearing it, wearing the
10 suits in a safe area just prior to possible entry into
11 contaminated areas.

12 Furthermore, all the service detectors, ranging from a
13 new generation of chemical reconnaissance vehicle to manned
14 portable detectors, have only the detectors for Soviet-made
15 agents. There was no detector or warning or alarm system
16 that might warn on western-made or any other agent not in use
17 by the Soviet armed forces.

18 Adding to this is the fact the Soviets themselves have
19 made a quite sizable deployment of chemical troops in
20 Afghanistan, routinely disseminating in the operation of
21 smoke screens. It is an indication of Soviet capabilities to
22 use chemical weapons. Because on the delivery systems used
23 and mentioned in the Soviet press as well as having been
24 pictured in the West, they are identical for both uses as
25 lethal agents.

1 We have Brigadier Wyty, the chemical officer of the 99th
2 artillery regiment, who defected in late 1984. He provided
3 very detailed, very explicit testimony as to how the Soviet
4 disseminate chemical weapons, location of soldiers and
5 everything.

6 So we have all the conclusive evidence one can get as to
7 the reports, the so-called unsubstantiated reports, of
8 personnel, of Afghan refugees who come out and describe
9 incidents in which they have been ostensibly subjected to
10 chemical weapons. We shall not find other eye witnesses
11 because in most cases they are dead.

12 What I do and have found to be highly successful is
13 asking these individuals for details about the method of
14 dissemination. These people never read the regulation book
15 of the Soviet armed forces, and yet they come up with a very
16 detailed description of things that they do not understand.
17 They tell you oh, well, there was a vehicle, eight wheels or
18 something like that, rather than identifying by kind. But
19 when comparing these details with known Soviet procedures of
20 delivery, you get very conclusive evidence these people know
21 what they are talking about, which brings me to the
22 conclusion that there is a massive use of chemical weapons in
23 Afghanistan and that it has been integrated fully into the
24 small routine military operation, just like rifles, part of
25 the game.

1 Senator Humphrey. You contend that the Soviets are
2 using chemical weapons on a routine basis.

3 Mr. Bodansky. Yes. And it is just another instrument
4 brought in should the need arise. If we look at the
5 testimonies that are available, although the number of
6 incidents had declined over the year, the percentage of
7 combat operation in which the commander of the unit has the
8 authority to use chemical weapons and in which chemical
9 weapons have been introduced over the years has risen
10 sharply. Today there are just merely far fewer regiment
11 operations in Afghanistan, and in that case there are fewer
12 cases in which chemical weapons can be brought into use.

13 But taking the percentages, the line is increasing. The
14 sophisticated effectiveness of the use is increasing. The
15 methods of dissemination are diversifying. I think that the
16 experience the Soviets get from there is highly valuable for
17 any further contingency, be it Central Europe or China.

18 Senator Humphrey. All right. Will you give us your
19 recommendations?

20 Mr. Bodansky. I think if one generalizes, what we need
21 to do is provide the Afghan resistance in the interior with
22 an alternative to civilian administration that is capable of
23 taking care of all the needs of the population, but in which
24 it is in charge. This, of course, includes or is a primary
25 goal of taking care of the security and safety of their

1 administration, which can be achieved through fighting
2 against the other side.

3 We need to start to realize that support because the
4 normal national liberation unit lives more on populace
5 support than the availability of one weapons system or
6 another.

7 The second thing is all of this should be done on a
8 long-term, protracted basis; that aid and assistance and
9 training should be pumped out and continued; that the
10 individual know that there is a whole organization behind
11 him.

12 If we do that, we can escalate. Just throwing in one
13 weapons system or another will not help. I think it is
14 possible. I think we are running out of time as far as this
15 is concerned. So if we can do this, if we can look at the
16 problem as a whole and answer all the requirements of the
17 resistance, we break the isolation, which is a Soviet
18 precondition for victory.

19 Senator Humphrey. What about in the area of public
20 policy?

21 Mr. Bodansky. Myself, I write a little bit. I have a
22 dismal record of getting the press to report the variety of
23 items that became known to me. I think once somehow the
24 public gets to know the severity of the problems, what is
25 happening, there are some details and plenty of them,

1 pictures and et cetera, then there will be a need for this
2 kind of information. But the media, for whatever its own
3 reasons, have been very reluctant to get involved in it.
4 That is not my expertise. I don't know anything about
5 western media beyond some sort of disappointment.

6 Senator Humphrey. Do you have expertise in the area of
7 international relations in the sense you would be aware of
8 opportunities missed by the West, by the United States, to
9 attack this from a public diplomacy angle?

10 Mr. Bodansky. I don't know. All I know is the data is
11 available and a lot of things that, for example, can be
12 explained to Europeans about the variety of European security
13 using precedence or the tactical experience coming from
14 Afghanistan have never been used. Nobody talks about the
15 influx of Soviet officers and senior NCOs to the offices in
16 Germany. We emphasize the common experience in Afghanistan
17 and not only their ability to utilize and integrate their
18 experience with prior experience but also to improve the
19 overall performance of that unit. That, for example, is
20 something that happens.

21 The same thing can be said about the north, the northern
22 flag, Sweden and everywhere else. But nobody would listen.
23 I don't know. The data is there. That is the only thing I
24 can say. It is there and it can be used.

25 Senator Humphrey. Mr. Alexiev?

1 Mr. Alexiev. There are, of course, many things that
2 could be done to counter the Soviet strategy which, as Yossef
3 mentions, here it has all three dimensions: political,
4 military and economic.

5 I think the West should have the strategy which
6 addresses the problem in all of these measures.

7 To start with the political effort, the fact is that
8 five years after the beginning of that war, the Afghans still
9 do not have any international representation, if you will.
10 It does not have to be a representation that is tied to any
11 one group or faction, but something that simply represents
12 the interests of the Afghan people without being political
13 about it.

14 I don't see any reason why there shouldn't be some group
15 of people or some forum that speaks for the Afghan interests
16 and then be represented at the UN. The PLO has an observer
17 status at the UN and even the notorious Soviet front
18 organization, KGB, such as at the World Peace Council, have
19 observers and at the UN. The Afghans, of course, do not. I
20 think this is something the West could help with.

21 Senator Humphrey. How? How do you get the Afghans to
22 unify even to the extent of just getting some kind of
23 international recognition?

24 Mr. Alexiev. I don't think you have to get the Afghans
25 unified in the sense that you get everybody in the various

1 parties to agree to become unified before you can do that.
2 What you can do, I think, is find a group or a distinguished
3 Afghan who is not partial to any political party and whose
4 job would be simply to expound the interests of the Afghan
5 people.

6 There are enough distinguished Afghans in this country,
7 many of them with diplomatic experience, that could fill that
8 slot. It seems to me if you make it clear to the groups in
9 Bashawar these people will be essentially their public
10 relations representatives and not get involved in the
11 politics of the resistance, I don't see why there should be
12 opposition to that.

13 Senator Humphrey. How could the United States recognize
14 such a person or group while it maintains diplomatic
15 relations with the Kabul government, as it does at present?

16 Mr. Alexiev. That is a question that I think the State
17 Department should answer. But I am puzzled as many others, I
18 am sure, because of the fact that we do grant diplomatic
19 recognition to the regime in Kabul and by doing that we in
20 effect legitimize this government to whatever extent.

21 The arguments that are usually given why we should do
22 that, such as the need to collect intelligence, basically
23 that is the only argument I have heard, does not hold much
24 water in my opinion. If that were the case, why don't we
25 have a diplomatic representation of Phnom Penh, for example,

1 or Luanda or Vietnam or other places?

2 I frankly do not understand why we continue to recognize
3 the regime. I think it is a very important political
4 obstacle to address the political dimension.

5 Senator Humphrey. That is quite true. As you heard
6 Ambassador Kirkpatrick say earlier, one of the reasons that
7 Mr. Gorbetsky got into a meeting with the President and Abdul
8 Hauk did not is we recognize the Kabul government. What a
9 perfect example of why that is such folly. Here we admit a
10 man who could be accused of being a criminal or a monster,
11 Mr. Gorbetsky, getting into the Oval Office, and a certified
12 hero who has been wounded about 16 times can't get in because
13 we recognize a public government of the Soviet Union. There
14 is a perfect example of how it works in real life when we do
15 something as foolish as legitimize a criminal puppet
16 government such as exists in Kabul. (Applause)

17 Mr. Alexiev. I cannot agree with you more on this
18 issue. Let me just add a footnote, that there are precedents
19 where the United States Government has not recognized the
20 incorporation of countries in the Soviet Union by force. The
21 obvious example is the Baltic nations which were invaded by
22 the Soviet Union, incorporated by the Soviet Union by force.
23 To this day the United States does not recognize that
24 annexation and in fact maintains diplomatic relations with
25 representatives in exile of these countries.

1 So the precedent is there and it is not clear to me what
2 the U.S. interest involved in this is; in other words, to
3 maintain an embassy.

4 Let me just say a couple words about the economic
5 dimension and the military dimension, to answer your question
6 as to the what could be done. It seems to me that again, in
7 my opinion, the economic problem is the more serious problem
8 in the short term, in the medium term. If the Soviets
9 succeed in denying the economic base of support to the
10 Mujahideen, I think the military effort would collapse by
11 itself.

12 I have talked myself to many people and anybody that has
13 followed Afghanistan can tell you that there are many cases
14 where the Afghans had to terminate military operations
15 because of the fact they did not have anything to eat. Just
16 recently I talked to one commander who had been besieging a
17 Soviet outpost and after two years of subsisting on boiled
18 alfalfa, they had to give up.

19 Here it is important to provide assistance inside of
20 Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the way the international aid
21 effort is structured now, it makes it almost attractive to
22 the Afghan peasant to leave the country because if nothing
23 else, they go to Pakistan, to the refugee camps, and at least
24 they are assured some food and shelter.

25 In other words, a good case could be made that people

1 inevitably go where the money is. The money right now is in
2 Pakistan. If we are able to provide them with economic
3 assistance inside the country, I am sure many Afghans who
4 live in rather wretched conditions in the refugee camps will
5 go back and will resume cultivating the land. Because the
6 problem with the disruption of agriculture is not only
7 disruption by Soviet bombing and destruction of the
8 irrigation systems, et cetera, burning the crops, which has
9 been well documented, but the fact that the economic
10 activities in the Afghanistan countryside are no longer
11 profitably, no longer meaningful. If a given peasant could
12 reckon with having to feed perhaps 50 Mujahideen every week
13 or month and yet he does not have enough for himself, he may
14 simply give up and move to Pakistan.

15 On the other hand, if we provide the Mujahideen and the
16 people inside with the means they need to be able to buy
17 their food, in my opinion this would inevitably result in an
18 improvement of the agricultural situation. In the long term,
19 that is a key factor for the viability of the effort. The
20 resistance simply cannot fight without the people to support
21 it. It is a key issue which is not only humanitarian but
22 also has military strategic implications.

23 On the military realm, again, it seems to me that the
24 problem has been that many weapons systems, above and beyond
25 some of the things that Yossef was saying, simply have not

1 been given to the Afghans. As a result, they are not capable
2 of raising the cost to the Soviets. Those systems should be
3 provided to them, training should be provided. That is very,
4 very important.

5 I don't think that the Afghans are as adept in using the
6 weapons as they should be, primarily because very little
7 training is provided to them. The weapons systems could
8 again be much more effective for them.

9 To give you one example, most Soviet airfields in
10 Afghanistan are surrounded by a mine defense perimeter which
11 is usually anywhere between three and four kilometers. This
12 is not totally by accident. The fact is the only long-range
13 weapon the Afghans have to do damage to these airfields is
14 the Soviet 82 millimeter mortar which gives a range of three
15 kilometers. Yet there are mortars in the western arsenals
16 which have ranges starting with 4.5 millimeters all the way
17 up to six kilometers. A weapon like that could really
18 dramatically improve their ability to fight.

19 Many of these areas are not defensible from such ranges.
20 Also, the airfields could expand their perimeters to be
21 beyond range of some of these weapons, again the anti-air
22 weapons that I don't think have been particularly effective.
23 They have been given, the Soviets, 12.7 machine guns and the
24 40.5 machine gun, and they are better weapons. It is a
25 question of political will, not necessarily of lacking the

1 technology.

2 There are a number of other things that could be done,
3 but these are just a couple of examples of what seems to me
4 needs to be done if we were to allow the Afghans to raise the
5 cost to the Soviets to where they may start having second
6 thoughts.

7 Senator Humphrey. Yossef?

8 Mr. Bodansky. Even with the weapons systems that they
9 have today, I think we can increase their effectiveness. For
10 example, if you organize the team teaching them how to zero
11 in the sightings of the 12.7 millimeter machine guns, they
12 can hit far better than they do today. Give them better
13 ammunition, simple things of that kind, and they can utilize
14 weapons available to them much more effectively than they do.
15 Again, I don't see any reason why such things should not be
16 done or cannot be done within a very brief period.

17 Senator Humphrey. All right. Gentlemen, thank you very
18 much for your expert testimony and your time and assistance.

19 The Task Force is adjourned.

20 (Whereupon, at 2:00 p.m., the task force was recessed,
21 to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.)
22
23
24
25